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Article
The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox:
The Common Link Between Blackmail
and Other Criminal Threats

KEN LEVY
Disclosure of true but reputation-damaging information is generally legal.
But threats to disclose true but reputation-damaging information unless payment
is made are generally criminal. Most scholars think that this situation is
paradoxical because it seems to involve illegality mysteriously arising out of
legality, a criminal act mysteriously arising out of an independently legal threat to
disclose conjoined with an independently legal demand for money. But this is not
quite right. The real paradox raised by the different legal statuses of blackmail
threats to disclose and disclosure itself involves a contradiction between our
strong intuition that blackmail threats should be criminal and some equally strong
arguments, all of which depend on the fact that disclosure is legal, that blackmail
threats should be legal. So an adequate solution to the real Blackmail Paradox
requires us either to drop the intuition or to refute the pro-legalization arguments.
This Article will adopt the latter approach. It will explain why the six main
arguments for legalizing blackmail threats all fail. In the course of refuting one of
these arguments, it will also offer a novel positive justification for criminalizing
blackmail threats. It will argue that they should be criminal for the same reason
that menacing, harassment, and stalking are criminal-namely, because they
involve the reasonable likelihood, and usually the intent, of putting the victim into
a state of especially great fear and anxiety. Of course, one might object that
disclosure itself is likely to have the same effect, if not malicious purpose. Yet,
again, it is still /ega/. But this point shows only that we as a society valuefreedom
of speech more than we value freedom from infliction of emotional injury. It does
not show that we do not value freedom from infliction of emotional injury
sufficiently to protect it when competing moral or institutional interests such as
freedom of speech are not at stake.
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The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox:
The Common Link Between Blackmail
and Other Criminal Threats
KEN LEVY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The so-called "Blackmail Paradox" starts with a simple legal fact: it is

criminally punishable to make certain threats even though the threatened
actions are by themselves perfectly legal. Consider the paradigmatic
blackmail threat by "Blackmailer" against "Target": "If you don't give me

$1000, I will send these pictures,

which prove that you are having an affair,
to your wife, friends, neighbors, and boss." 1 Blackmailer' s making this
threat against Target constitutes a criminal act--even if Target did have an
affair, Blackmailer does have the pictures, and Blackmailer obtained these

pictures /egally.

2 Yet if Blackmailer had not made the threat, it would have

"' J.D., Columbia University Law School; Ph.D., Philosophy, Rutgers University; B.A.,
Philosophy, Williams College. Member, New York State Bar. Visiting Teaching Fellow, Columbia
Law School. I would like to thank the following individuals for helpful discussions about blackmail
and/or useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper: Jessica Attie, David Bender, Mitchell Berman,
Walter Block, Kathryn H. Christopher, Russell Christopher, George Fletcher, Kent Greenawalt, Doug
Husak, James Lindgren, The Honorable Richard Posner, The Honorable Jed Rakoff, David Reiss, Saul
Smilansky, and George Vuoso.
1 This Article will continue to use money as the object sought by the blackmailer.
But other
benefits would work just as well--e.g., sex, a job, a job recommendation, a promotion, a

recommendation for promotion, property, political liberties, a larger divorce settlement, more kindness
in a relationship, favorable testimony, a pardon, or legislation. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW 550 (1995); Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory ofBlackmail: Taking Motives Seriously,

65 U.

CHI. L. RE V.

795, 864 (1998) ("[T]he blackmailer need not demand money. Nor need he even

seek private advantage (narrowly defined)."); Walter Block, The Crime of Blackmail: A Libertarian

Critique, 1 8 CRJM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 3-4 (1999); George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic
Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1617, 1621 (1993); Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmailfrom A to C, 141 U. PA. L.
REv. 1905, 1910 ( 1 993); Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms ofArm-Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. RE V.
1 567, 1568 ( 1 993); Kenneth Kipnis, Blackmail as a Career Choice: A Liberal Assessment, 1 8 C RIM.
JUST. ETHICS 1 9, 20 (1 999); Grant Lamond, Coercion, Threats and the Puzzle ofBlackmail, in HARM
AND CULPABILITY 2 1 5, 2 16 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996); James Lindgren, More
Blackmail Ink: A Critique of Blackmail, Inc., Epstein's Theory of Blackmail, 16 CONN. L. REv. 909,
917- 1 8 ( 1 984).
2

See, for example, the New York criminal code, which includes blackmail under both its criminal

coercion and larceny by extortion statutes. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 1 35.60 (McKinney 2004) ("Coercion in
the second degree") states in relevant part:
A person is guilty of coercion in the second degree when he compels or induces a
person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to abstain from
engaging in, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which he has a legal right to
engage, by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the demand is not complied with,
the actor or another will:
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been perfectly legal for Blackmailer to send the pictures to Target's wife,
friends, neighbors, and boss.
It is easy enough to explain why disclosure of Target' s affair to third

parties is legal. To be sure, it would very likely harm Target's reputation

as a faithful, loving husband.3 But, despite the damage that such a truthful
disclosure will

cause to

Target's

reputation

(and

other reputation-

4. Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be
instituted against him; or
5. Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false,
tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule ... .
And N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 155.05 (McKinney 1999) ("Larceny'') states in relevant part:
2. Larceny includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's
property, with the intent prescribed in subdivision one of this section,
committed in any of the following ways:
(e) By extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he
compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or
to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property
is not so delivered, the actor or another will:
(iv) Accuse some person of a crime or cause
criminal charges to be instituted against him; or
(v) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact,
whether true or false, tending to subject some person
to hatred, contempt or ridicule ... .
Like N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60, MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
("Criminal Coercion") states in relevant part:
(I) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of criminal coercion if,
with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to his
detriment, he threatens to:
(b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or
(c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute .. ..
And like N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05, MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
("Theft by Extortion") states in relevant part:
A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of
another by threatening to:
(2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or
(3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or
business repute . .. . .
3 Lawrence M. Friedman offers a study of the way in which reputation and the laws protecting it
have evolved since the 19th century. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy,
Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1093 (2002). Notably,
Friedman suggests that blackmail laws historically "protected (or tried to protect) reputation," id. at
1113, and that blackmail has a"more limited orbit," id. at 1126, than it did in the 19th and first half of
the 20th century because what previously constituted a damaging secret is either (a) no longer (as)
damaging due to ever-liberalizing norms of"respectability," id. at 1120, 1131, or (b) not a secret in the
first place due to our ever-shrinking bubbles of privacy. See id. at 1119-32. Regarding (b), see also
Michael Levin, Blockmai/, 18 CRIM.JUST. ETHICS II, 13 (1999) ("It is a cliche that privacy is already
tenuous in a world of electronic billing and ubiquitous camcorders.").
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dependent interests),4 disclosure-whether in the form of gossip, tattling,
or journalism-is justified by the institution of freedom of speech.

Still, if disclosure is legal, then it would seem that the threat to disclose
should also be legal.5 For both the threat and the threatened action are
4

While reputation may be the primary interest threatened by the blackmailer, secondary

interests-interests that depend largely on reputation and therefore would likely also be injured if
reputation were injured-include relationships and occupation or career.

Scott Altman lists other

interests that blackmailers may also threaten: "loss of dignity . . . safety, freedom . . . and other
similarly central aspects of the individual's life." Scott Altman, A

Patchwork Theory ofBlackmail, 141

U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1641 (1993).
s

Conversely, some might argue that if the blackmail threat to disclose is illegal, then disclosure

itself should be illegal as well. For different views on this point, see Altman,

supra note 4, at 1652-53

(the wrongfulness of blackmail cannot be explained by the wrongfulness of disclosure); Berman, supra
note 1, at 798, 843, 844-48, 849-51, 854 (only the blackmail threat, not disclosure, should be criminal
because while both may lead to harm, (a) the blackmail threat is much more likely to arise from
"morally culpable motives" and (b) enforcement of criminal law against disclosure with bad motives

would involve a number of virtually insurmountable practical difficulties); Walter Block, The Case for
De-Criminalizing Blackmail: A Reply to Lindgren and Campbell, 24 W. ST. U. L. REv. 225, 236 (1997)
(the mere immorality of threatening to gossip is not sufficient for crirninalization); Richard A. Epstein,

Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 553, 561 (1983) ("It is quite impossible to escape the problem of
blackmail by redefining the property rights of [the victim] and/or [the third party] to make unlawful the
disclosure of true information not itself acquired by wrongful actions."); Hugh Evans, Why Blackmail
Should Be Banned, 65 PHIL. 89, 93 (1990) ("In most cases, the right to free speech prevails over the
right not to be harmed."); Joel Feinberg, The Paradox of Blackmail, 1 RATIO JURIS 83, 89-94 (1988)
(there is no paradox in crirninalizing blackmail because the disclosure of embarrassing information is
or should be illegal); Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
43, 44, 47 n . l 3, 52-53, 56 (1992) (public disclosure is legally permissible only because of "practical
considerations"-namely, the costs and difficulties of enforcement; without these practical problems,
"the malicious unilateral
prohibited as the

disclosure of the information" is just as wrong and therefore would be just
threat of disclosure); Russell Hardin, Blackmailing for Mutual Good, 141 U. PA. L.

REv. 17&7, 1793 (1993) ("Any claim to outlaw blackmail might seem weak if at the same time the sale
of embarrassing information on another to the press remains legal."); Isenbergh,

supra note I, at 1913

("For some [who support the prohibition of blackmail], I think, the prohibition of bargaining between
[the blackmailer] and [the target] serves as a proxy for a prohibition of [the blackmailer's] disclosure to

[a third party]. That is, the premise that [the blackmailer] is free to disclose or keep secret private
information about [the target] is not fully accepted."); Lamond,

supra note 1, at 232 (disclosure is not
Blackmail: On

punished because its consequences are not "sufficiently serious"); James Lindgren,

Waste, Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA L. REv. 597, 600 (1989) ("[I]f we changed the law so that
it stopped the release of true information, then the [Blackmail Paradox] would disappear."); Richard H.
McAdams,

Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2255-58, 2279-82 (1996)

("[G]ossip serves as a way of adjudicating disputes over norm violations, and this process, in tum,
refines the content of norms to resolve specific concerns."); Jeffrey Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156, 165 (1980) (even journalism does not morally justify deliberately
embarrassing another, but ''we allow it reluctantly as the lesser of two evils (the greater evil would be
to chill the press)."); David Owens, Should Blackmail Be Banned?, 63 PHIL. 501, 503 (1988) ("Do we
really believe the threat of publication is so terrible? If so, why don't we ban publication? Why do we
forbid him to make the threat but not forbid him to carry it out?

threat that does the harm."); Richard A. Posner,

Surely, it is the carrying out of the

Blackmail, Privacy and Freedom of Contract, 141 U.

PA. L. REV. 1817, 1835 (1993) (gossip is an "informal and very cheap system of deterring . . . lesser
forms of wrongdoing"); Henry E. Smith, The Harm in Blackmail, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 861, 879-80
(199&) (there is no law against disclosure itself in part because disclosure, unlike the blackmail threat,
will not lead to victim self-help and therefore to the harms that typically result from victim self-help).
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normally on the same legal footing. If the threatened action is legal (or
illegal), then the threat is also legal (or illegal). Conversely, if the threat is
legal (or illegal), then so is the threatened action. And there is a reason for
this correlation. On the one hand, if a particular threat is sufficiently

dangerous or wrong to be criminalized, then surely the threatened action

which is arguably even more dangerous and therefore more wrong than the
threat-should be criminalized as well. On the other hand, if a particular
action is not sufficiently dangerous or wrong to be criminalized, then
surely the threat of such an action-which is arguably even less dangerous

and therefore less wrong than the threatened action itself-should not be
6
criminalized either.
So blackmail threats curiously depart from this

normal state of affairs.

Again, while disclosure is perfectly legal,

blackmail threats to disclose are illegal (criminal!).
Two arguments might be made here. First, one might argue that this

departure from the norm is rather easy to explain. After all, the reason that

disclosure is legal does not equally apply to the threat of disclosure.
Again, disclosure is legal because it is supported by the institution of
freedom of speech. And freedom of speech justifies only communication.

It does not at all justify the opposite of communication-silence (including
concealment).

Nor, therefore, does it justify, or even relate to, a

blackmailer's attempt to reap a profit from this silence.7
may be true as far as it goes.

This argument

But it does not go far enough.

It fails to

explain why blackmail threats should be criminalized in the first place.

Yes, blackmail threats are not justified by the institution of freedom of

speech. But many activities are not supported by free speech and yet are
perfectly legal. So why doesn't the same hold true of blackmail threats?

Why are they singled out from all of these other non-free-speech-supported
activities for criminal punishment?
Second, one might argue that there is nothing paradoxical about this

departure from the norm. The fact that blackmail threats depart from the

normal correlation between the legal statuses of threats and threatened
actions hardly by itself constitutes a paradox.

After all, there are

6 For a characteristically astute and highly nuanced approach to threats, see KENT GREENAWALT,
SPEECH, CRIMES, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 90--109 (1989).
7 See Altman, supra note 4, at 1653; Evans, supra note 5, at 93 (''The right to free speech . . .
justifies [a journalist's] harming [another] by publishing his secrets. It cannot permit harming him by
extorting money for not publishing; the aims of free speech are not served thereby, and cannot give any
justification for such an act. "); A. L. Goodhart, Blackmail and Consideration in Contracts, 44 LA w Q.
REv. 436, 437 (1928) (quoting R v. Denyer, (1926) 2 K.B. 258, 268 ("There is not the remotest nexus
or relationship between a right to (perform a harmful action A] and a right to demand [money] from
[the target] as the price of abstaining from [performing A]. "); Wendy J. Gordon, Tntth and
Consequences: The Force ofBlackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1770 (1993); James
Lindgren, In Defense of Keeping Blackmail a Crime: Responding to Block and Gordon, 20 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 35, 41 (1986) (emphasizing the distinction between suppression and release of information).
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exceptions to every rule. And most such exceptions are not considered
paradoxical. So why blackmail?

The most common answer to this question is that by criminalizing
blackmail, we have mysteriously turned "two rights into a wrong." That is,
we have combined two perfectly legal acts-a demand (request) for money
and a threat (warning) to perform a legal action (e.g., disclosure)-into one
illegal act. 8 But contrary to the common wisdom, this explication of the
9
Blackmail Paradox is far too metaphorical to capture its essence. Yes, it
might seem odd that

an

otherwise legal demand in conjunction with

an

otherwise legal threat to perform a legal action should be illegal. But odd
is not paradoxical. Odd simply involves a deviation from the norm.
0
Paradoxical involves a contradiction between intuition and argument. 1 So
8 See LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF
THE LAW 1 33 (1 996); Berman, supra note 1, at 796; Block, supra note 1, at 3;Walter Block, Trading
Moneyfor Silence, 8 U. HAW. L. REV. 57, 63, 69 ( 1986); Walter Block& RobertW. McGee, Blackmail
from A to Z: A Reply to Joseph Jsenbergh 's "Blackmailfrom A to C, 50 MERCER L. REv. 569, 569-71
( 1 999); Kathryn H. Christopher, Toward a Resolution ofBlackmail's Second Paradox, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.
J. 1 1 27, 1 130 (2005); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 84-85; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1 6 17; Hardin, supra
note 5, at 1 795; Katz, supra note 1, at 1567; Lindgren, supra note 5, at 598; Lindgren, supra note 1, at
909; James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 670, 670-71, 680
( 1 984); Murphy, supra note 5, at 1 57; Ronald Joseph Scalise, Jr., Blackmail, Legality, and Liberalism,
74 TuL. L. REv. 1 483, 1 484, 1502 (2000); Smith, supra note 5, at 862, 887; Glanville L. Williams,
Blackmail, CRIM. L. REv. 79, 163 ( 1 954) (''The two things that taken separately are moral and legal
whites together make a moral and legal black.").
9 For other critical views of this version, see Russell Christopher, Meta-Blackmail, 94 GEO. L.J.
739, 743-45 (2006); Michael Clark, There is No Paradox of Blackmail, 54 ANALYSIS 54, 55-56
( 1 994); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 85; Hardin, supra note 5, at 1 795-96; Lamond, supra note 1, at 2 1 6
n.l ("(l]here is nothing strictly paradoxical in treating the combination o f two elements differently
from the way each element is treated in isolation, nor in treating the threat of an action differently from
the action itself."); Saul Smilansky, Blackmail, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 1 5 1 , 1 5 1-52 (Lawrence
C. Becker& Charlotte B. Becker eds., 200 1 ) [hereinafter Smilansky, Blackmailj; Saul Smilansky, May
We Stop Worrying About Blackmail?, 55 ANALYSIS 1 1 6, 1 1 6 (1995) [hereinafter Smilansky, May We
Stop Worrying].
10 In personal correspondence, some have taken issue with my conception of a paradox. One
objection is that I am being overly technical; a paradox is nothing more than a proposition that is true
but bizarre or counterintuitive or apparently self-contradictory. Another objection is that a paradox is a
conflict not between intuition and argument but rather between one intuition and another. I do not
necessarily reject either of these possibilities. For the time being, however, I maintain my position,
which derives from classic paradoxes in Philosophy-particularly, Zeno's Paradoxes and the Surprise
Exam Paradox. Both kinds of paradox involve a contradiction between an intuition (e.g., there is
motion) and an argument (e.g., because (a) every distance contains an infinity of sub-distances, (b) it is
impossible to traverse an infinity of sub-distances, and (c) motion is just traversal of a distance, motion
is impossible). (For helpful accounts of these paradoxes, see, for example, MICHAEL CLARK,
PARADOXES FROM A TO Z 1-4, 7-8, 1 38-4 1, 1 59-{)0, 206-08 (2002)). My conception of paradox
would explain why paradoxes may generally be resolved by maintaining the intuition and refuting the
argument. As one author suggests, paradoxes "are resolved by pointing to the fallacy that generates
them." George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1 263, 1 263 ( 1 985)
(citation omitted). Fletcher, however, may diverge from me when he suggests in the preceding
sentence: "[P]aradoxes are contradictions that result from overlooking an accepted canon of consistent
thought." !d. at 1 263.
"
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it remains to be seen what is paradoxical about the criminalization of
blackmail.
The real paradox-the contradiction between intuition and argument

is this. On the one hand, we tend to think that blackmail threats are rightly
criminalized.

That is our strong intuition.

On the other hand, there are

some very good arguments-six in fact-that lead to the very opposite

conclusion, the conclusion that blackmail threats should be perfectly
legal. 1 1
To solve this paradox-the real Blackmail Paradox-we have one of

two choices.

First, we may hold that our intuition is wrong, that the

criminalization of blackmail is simply a giant legislative mistake, and
therefore that blackmail threats should be just as legal as disclosure. A
2
significant minority of scholars adopt this "pro-legalization" approach. 1

11
For various formulations of the Blackmail Paradox, see Altman, supra note 4, at 1639; Berman,
supra note 1, at 800 ("[B]Iackmail is an exception to the general rule of law and morals that one may
threaten to exercise one's rights."); Block, supra note 5, at 225; James Boyle, A Theory of Law and
Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1479, 1486
(1 992); R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 743-45; Ronald Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture:
Blac/cmail, 14 VA. L. REv. 655, 667--68 ( 1 988); Epstein, supra note 5, at 561 (''The general proposition
that a party may [not] threaten that which he may do makes blackmail an anomalous exception to the
general pattern of both criminal and civil responsibility."); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman,
Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1 849-50 (1993); Gordon,
supra note 7, at 1 742; Gorr, supra note 5, at 43, 52 ("[1]he most important cases in which there is
likely to be a serious question about the legal permissibility of blackmail are those in which the act that
would motivate the blackmail (1) is morally wrong, (2) involves some significant harm to another
person, and (3) is (justifiably) [neither required nor forbidden by the criminal law]."); Isenbergh, supra
note 1 , at 1 932; Katz, supra note 1 , at 1 567, 1595, 1598; Kipnis, supra note 1 , at 19; Lamond, supra
note 1 , at 215-16, 230-3 1 , 23 7 (how does the threat to do ''what would otherwise be permissible" in
conjunction with a demand for money constitute (a) a moral wrong, no Jess (b) a "serious criminal
offence"?); James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction,
141 U. PA. L. REV 1 695, 1 695 (1993); Lindgren, supra note 7, at 35; Lindgren, supra note 8, at 67778; McAdams, supra note 5, at 2266--67; Murphy, supra note 5, at 1 60; Scalise, supra note 8, at 1502
("[l]f blackmail simply presents one with two legal options (i.e., acquiesce to the demand or be
subjected to the threatened action), how can increasing one's options turn a legal transaction into an
illegal one?"); Smith, supra note 5, at 864.
Different scholars have different opinions about the difficulty and legitimacy of the Blackmail
Paradox. See, e.g., Block, supra note 5, at 228 (criticizing Lindgren for failing "to even consider that
the legal proscription of blackmail could be mistaken and incomprehensible on rational grounds.");
Clark, supra note 9, at 55-56 (adopting the defal tionary position that the Blackmail Paradox is not
paradoxical at all); Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox, 141 U.
PA. L. REv. 1663, 1665 (1993) (the Blackmail Paradox "may not yield to rational analysis."); Gordon,
supra note 7, at 1 741 (the Blackmail Paradox is "neither puzzling nor paradoxical"; instead, it
generates an "irony"); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality:
Blackmail, Extortion and Robbery, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1 877, 1902 (1 993) (the Blackmail Paradox does
not seem paradoxical ''when viewed through the lens of economics.").
12
For articles advocating the view that blackmail should be either largely or entirely legalized,
see MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 124-26 ( 1 998); Walter Block, Blackmail is
Private Justice: A Reply to Brown, 34 U. BRlT. COLUMBIA L. REV. 1 1, 1 1 -12 (2000) [hereinafter,
Block, Private Justice]; Walter Block, Replies to Levin and Kipnis, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 23, 23
(1 999) [hereinafter Block, Replies]; Block, supra note 5, at 225, 236; Block, supra note 1, at 3-4;
.
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Second, we may hold that our intuition is correct. The vast maj ority of
13
scholars who discuss the issue adopt this "pro-criminalization" approach.
Most pro-criminalizers believe that their primary, if not exclusive, task

is to provide an adequate, positive justification for the criminalization of

blackmail. And, indeed, they have been quite creative in this area. They

have argued that the criminalization of blackmail is justified because:
Walter Block,

Toward a Libertarian Theory ofBlackmail, 15 J.LIBERTARIAN STUD. 55, 55-57 (2001)
Libertarian Theory]; Block, supra note 8, at 62-63; Walter Block & Gary M.
Anderson, Blackmail, Extortion and Exchange, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 541, 560-61 (2001); Walter
Block & David Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to Posner, Epstein, Nozick
and Lindgren, 19 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 37, 38, 54 (1985); Block& McGee, supra note 8, at 569, 569-71;
R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 782-84 ((a) "meta-blackmail"-i.e., a threat to make a blackmail
[hereinafter Block,

threat-is either more "serious" a crime, equally serious, or less serious a crime than conventional
blackmail; (b) none of these three logically exhaustive answers is adequate; and (c) the only way to
resolve this trilemma is to de-criminalize conventional blackmail); Feinberg,

supra note 5, at 88-89,
94-95 ("on liberal grounds," blackmail threats to disclose information that the target has engaged in
"devious trickery or underhanded dealing" should be legalized); Gorr, supra note 5, at 48-49 (some

"high-minded" blackmail-i.e., blackmail in which the blackmailer truly deserves what the blackmail
target acquired "by legally permissible trickery and underhanded dealing"-should be legally
permitted); Isenbergh,

supra note l , at 1908, 1926-32 (proposing a system that would prohibit only

blackmail

incriminating

involving

information); Eric Mack, In Defense

information,

not

blackmail

involving

merely

embarrassing

ofBlackmail, 41 PHIL.STUD. 273 (1982); Scalise, supra note 8, at

1486 (agreeing largely with Feinberg that "blackmail is not a justifiable crime under a liberal system
... blackmail cannot legitimately be criminalized because no one's rights are violated"). For various
pictures of what society would look like if blackmail were legalized, see Block & Gordon, supra, at

45;
supra note 11, at 1478, 1487; Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA.
L. REv. 1935, 1944-46 (1993); Epstein, supra note 5, at 562-64; Levin, supra note 3, at 13-14;
Mc Adams, supra note 5, at 2245; Owens, supra note 5, at 503-04; Shaven, supra note II, at 1891; and
Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 153.
Boyle,

13

Another approach to blackmail that some scholars take is to propose not justifications but rather

explanations of its criminalization.

See Peter Alldridge, Attempted Murder of the Soul: Privacy and
Secrets, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 368, 385-87 (1993) (blackmail is criminal because the kinds of
threats it usually involves, threats to expose sexual secrets, are more frightening than any other kind of
secret; they threaten to expose the "true" self behind the person's public persona); Block, supra note 5,
at 246 ("One theory [of why so many believe that blackmail should be prohibited] is that the
prohibition of blackmail is hoary with tradition. Blackmail has been against the law for so long that
commentator's [sic] first instinct is to attempt to find explanations for this state of affairs, and by the
very nature of all such efforts they soon enough come to resemble attempted justifications."); DeLong,

supra note 11, at 1691 (we share a communitarian ethic according to which "the blackmail story elicits
a strong identification with the victim's hopelessness and isolation" and "a blackmailer betrays ...the
victim by demanding money for silence and betrays the public by accepting it"); Friedman, supra note
3, at 1112, 1116 (blackmail was initially criminalized in part because a blackmailer's act of threatening
to expose a target's secrets conflicted with the American value of "mobility"-i.e., ''the right to start
over again, to begin a new life, unencumbered by the debris of the old one."); Murphy, supra note

5, at
156 (our strong moral distaste for blackmail is only an explanation, not a justification, of its
criminalization); Scalise, supra note 8, at 1501-02 ("The moral intuition that blackmail is wrong

appears to be . . . because the blackmailee's situation is one for which empathy often exists. Everyone
can imagine oneself in the unenviable position of the blackmailee.

In such a situation, a reputable

citizen seems to have very little choice-either pay the demanded amount or risk social opprobrium
and societal shame."); Smilansky,

May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at 118-19 ("Part of the

explanation for the perplexing attitude of common-sense morality on [blackmail] is probably cynical,
e.g. that the thought of being blackmailed in the ordinary ways is frightening to the rich and powerful
in society, who may be less concerned with e.g. the threats of employers or politicians.").
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1 ) it

helps to maximize disclosure of incriminating
information and thereby deter criminal activity; 1 4

2) it helps to minimize wasteful, inefficient, or private law
enforcement; 1 5

14

For various positions on this issue, see GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 93-94 (there are three

"instances of blackmail": those in which (a) disclosure would be "socially desirable"; (b) disclosure
would be "socially undesirable but not illegal"; and (c) "the harm and benefit of disclosure are about
evenly balanced"); POSNER, supra note 1, at 549, 549-50 (supporting proposition (1) but conceding
that it is speculative); Berman, supra note 1, at 812-13 (prohibition of blackmail does not produce
optimal deterrence and might even increase its incidence relative to legalization); Block, Private
Justice, supra note 12, at 14 (Brown's assumption that "in the absence of legalization of blackmail the
blackmailer would have spilled the beans to the police . .. appears unwarranted"); Block, supra note 8,
at 72-73 ("[O]ne cannot overlook the indirect effect of the blackmailer in reducing crime. [T]he more
[the blackmailer preys on the criminal], the less .. . crime there will be. The law of economic incentive
applies to shoplifters as well as blackmailers."); Block& Gordon, supra note 12, at 39-44 (legalization
of blackmail would "retard" crime because "miscreants would now have to share their ill-gotten gains
with the blackmailer."); Clark, supra note 9, at 58 ("It is a matter for empirical inquiry whether de
criminalizing blackmail would mean that significantly more crime was concealed: and not only do we
lack the evidence for this but it seems unlikely that we shall ever have it, considering the nature of the
conduct involved."); DeLong, supra note 11, at 1670-72 (criticizing Posner); Friedman, supra note 3,
at 1112 ("[M]aking blackmail a crime might deter possible blackmailers."); Ginsburg& Shechtman,

supra note I I, at 1871-73 (blackmail is not always an efficient deterrent); Gordon, supra note 7, at
1751-53 ((a) legalization might actually lead to more, not less, disclosure; (b) not all of this disclosure
will be socially valuable; and (c) while legalization might help to promote deterrence and some socially
valuable disclosure, the transaction costs involved in blackmail transactions might outweigh these
benefits); Gorr, supra note 5, at 49 ("[B]Iackmail remains clearly paradoxical only in cases where the
blackmailer

(1) obtains her information innocently, (2) is under no special obligation to maintain

confidentiality, (3) demands, in return for her silence, that the victim perform an act that is not itself
either legally required or legally forbidden, and (4) threatens that, if her demands go unmet, she will
perform an act that is not itself either legally required or legally forbidden."); James Lindgren,

Blackmail: An Afterword, 141 U. PA . L. REv. 1975, 1984-85 (1993) (it is wrong to assume that without
an incentive to blackmai� embarrassing or incriminating information would not otherwise be disclosed
because the simple fact is that people like to gossip); Lindgren, supra note 5, at 602-03 (same);
McAdams, supra note 5, at 2268--{)9 (criminalization of blackmail does not necessarily lead to less
overall crime because while criminalization leads to relatively greater disclosure than would
legalization, legalization would lead to greater detection of crime-specifically, a greater incentive
among private citizens to detect criminal activity among their fellow citizens; and it is not clear which
of these--greater disclosure or greater detection--,.would serve as a stronger deterrent); Posner, supra
note 5, at 1839-41 (it is not clear that severe punishment for blackmail is warranted "from a deterrent
standpoint''); Shaven, supra note 11, at 1891-92, 1899-1901 (it is not clear what effect the prohibition
of blackmail has on deterrence because while it is less probable that crime will be discovered and
therefore punished, the magnitude of the punishment for the crimes that are discovered will be greater
than if blackmail were legal); Smith, supra note 5, at 897-906 (while criminalization can help to
increase the costs of enforcement, it does help to minimize the costs of victim self-help); Jeremy
Waldron, Blackmail

as

Complicity 16-17 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Connecticut

Law Review) (rejecting proposition (1) above).
15 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enf
orcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 2, 42 (I 975) (blackmail is a crime because society prefers ''to rely on a public monopoly of
law enforcement in some areas of enforcement, notably criminal law"). For various positions on this
issue, see POSNER, supra note I, at 548 ("There is no completely adequate economic explanation for
why ["regulatory" (i.e., private-law-enforcing)] blackmail is illegal."); Block, Private Justice, supra
note 12, at 17, 23-24, 30-37 (criticizing Landes and Posner and Brown); Boyle, supra note 11, at 1472

2007]

3)
4)

THE SOLUTION TO THE REAL BLACKMAIL PARADOX

1061

it helps to maximize disclosure of, and thereby deter,
6
immoral activity;1
it helps to prevent a market in embarrassing information
from developing, which itself helps to discourage wasteful
and invasive efforts to discover embarrassing information
l7
about others .
'

5)

it helps to mtmmtze wasteful or inefficient economic
8

activity; 1

(criticizing Landes and Posner); Brown, supra note 12, at 1936-37, 1940, 1943-49, 1952-58, 1967-73
(criticizing Landes and Posner and taking a position similar to Epstein's); Epstein, supra note 5, at
561-62, 564 (while the legalization of blackmail would have a deterrent effect by encouraging some
would-be criminals to refrain from criminal activity for fear of being blackmailed with this information
afterward, the problems with "private justice" outweigh its deterrent benefits); Ginsburg & Shechtman,
supra note 11, at 1874 (even if the private enforcement of social norms would be inefficient, this point
would not explain why blackmail that does not involve social norms-i.e., blackmail involving
information that is embarrassing yet not morally repugnant-is prohibited); Gordon, supra note 7, at
1753 (favorably mentioning Landes and Posner); Lindgren, supra note 1, at 911 (criticizing Landes and
Posner); Lindgren, supra note 8, at 697-99 (same); Posner, supra note 5, at 1823-28, 1835, 1841
(surveying arguments for and against blackmail as a means of private law enforcement and concluding
that they are not strong or certain enough to warrant legalization).
16 See Block & McGee, supra note 8, at 584, 587; Isenbergh, supra note l , at 1918-19, 1931-32.
Berman rejects this point. Berman, supra note 1, at 807.
17 See Altman, supra note 4, at 1659; Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 11, at 1860; Isenbergh,
supra note 1, at 1914-15, 1924-26; Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 43; Levin, supra note 3, at 12;
McAdams, supra note 5, at 2246-49, 2268; Murphy, supra note 5, at 164-65. But see Coase, supra
note 11, at 674 (while the prohibition of blackmail discourages wasteful investigations, this benefit by
itself does not justify criminalization); Kipnis, supra note 1, at 20 ("Although some might worry that
[the financial incentives of engaging in legalized blackmail] would unleash battalions of privacy
invading investigators, Block reminds us that our tabloids and private detective agencies have already
loosed these legions upon us."). Lindgren rejects this proposal because of the possibilities of
"adventitious" or "opportunistic" and ''participant" blackmail. Lindgren, supra note 5, at 601;
Lindgren, supra note 1, at 911; Lindgren, supra note 8, at 689-91, 694. Neither kind of blackmail
involves information discovered through deliberate effort or investigation. Rather, the former involves
information discovered accidentally, and the latter involves information learned through participation
in the very same activity. See Berman, supra note 1, at 803-04, 806-07, 837; Boyle, supra note 11, at
1474-75.
18 A number of scholars endorse this point. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 85
(1974) (blackmail constitutes an unproductive exchange because the target prefers either that she had
not dealt with the blackmailer or that the blackmailer had not existed); POSNER, supra note 1, at 549
("In the subset of cases in which the [blackmail] threat has no regulatory potential-when its only
pwpose and effect are to transfer wealth from the victim to the threatener-the case for prohibition can
. . . be made. In fact it resembles the case against simple extortion. Both are cases of sterile, in the
sense of unproductive, wealth transfers, producing a net social loss measured by the value of the
resources used to make and defend against such transfers."); Altman, supra note 4, at 1643 (if
blackmail were allowed, everybody would be worse off, conversely, there are few costs to prohibiting
it); Coase, supra note 11, at 670-74, esp. 673-74; Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 11, at 1865 ("[A]
legal system designed to maximize allocative efficiency would penalize not only (1) threats to do an act
that the threatener has no right to do, i.e., that would occasion criminal or civil liability, but also (2)
threats to do something that the threatener does have a right to do but that would (a) consume real
resources, and (b) yield no product other than the enjoyment of spite or of an enhanced reputation as a
credible issuer of threats. Reciprocally, it would not penalize the utterance of a threat to take an action
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6) it helps to minimize victims' attempts at "self-help"

namely, retaliating with violence against blackmailers or
third parties, turning to crime (theft or fraud) to pay off
19
their blackmailers, and suicide;

7) blackmail causes serious harm (other than or in addition to
the harms listed above); and/or

8) blackmail is seriously immoral.20
that is (I) lawful in itself, i.e., neither tortious nor criminal, and (2) would confer some material benefit
on the party making the threat."); Gordon, supra note 7, at 1749-58, 1771-74, 1783-84; McAdams,
supra note 5, at 2264-91 (while the "ban" on blackmail does not lead to a perfectly efficient
distribution of information, it still leads to a more efficient distribution of information than legalization
would); Posner, supra note 5, at 1818 ("[A)Ithough ostensibly a voluntary transaction between
consenting adults, [blackmail) is likely to be, on average, wealth-reducing rather than wealth
maximizing."); Scalise, supra note 8, at 1503 ("For unproductive, nonmarket-price blackmail, . . .
[w]hile one's options appear to increase, in actuality, no increase occurs. Any apparent addition to the
universe of one's options occurs in form only, not in substance."); Shavell, supra note I I, at 1894-95,
1897-99 (on balance, blackmail activity on the part of both blackmailers and targets is a "social
waste").
1 9 See generally Smith, supra note 5, at 862--63, 855--63, 866-84, 894-95, 896-97, 905-14. See
also Epstein, supra note 5, at 564; Gordon, supra note 7, at 1776-78, 1783; Kipnis, supra note 1, at 21.
20 Berman and Lindgren attempt to separate arguments that blackmail is seriously immoral from
arguments that blackmail leads to serious injuries. Berman, supra note I , at 799-833; Lindgren, supra
note 8, at 680-701. This task is difficult because many arguments seem to fall into both categories. So
they will simply be lumped all together here. See Altman, supra note 4, at 1640-46, 1648-51, 1661
(though only some, not all, blackmail threats involve "coercion, exploitation, breached obligation, and
consequential harms," even relatively innocuous blackmail transactions should still be illegal because
they are rare, hard to distinguish from the more virulent blackmail threats, and difficult to enforce);
Berman, supra note I , at 798, 833-52 (the blackmail threat itself is strong evidence that the
blackmailer's threatened action, whether or not carried out, springs from morally unacceptable motives;
and morally unacceptable motives in conjunction with actual or threatened harm amounts to a
criminalizable act); Boyle, supra note I I , at 1485 ("[W)e do not think that we should commodify
relationships in the private realm. To commodify is itself to violate the private realm. To commodify a
violation of privacy, then, is doubly reprehensible." (citation omitted)); A.H . Campbell, The Anomalies
ofBlackmail, 55 LAW Q. REv. 382, 389 (1939) (a transaction is blackmail and should be criminal if the
proposer surrenders an interest only to make a profit, not to promote a "lawful business interest");
Debra J. Campbell, Why Blackmail Should Be Crimina/ized: A Reply to Walter Block and David
Gordon, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 883, 887-91 (1988) (the target is entitled to non-interference with her
secret); Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1626-28, 1634-35, 1637 (the blackmail transaction generates a
relationship of domination and subordination); Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 11, at 1873 ("[I]t is
almost surely against the disruption of social rather than trade relationships that the prohibition of
blackmail is directed."); Gordon, supra note 7, at 1748--6 1, 1769-70, 1774, 1776-82 (in addition to the
possible economic and law enforcement problems that legalization would create, blackmail is wrong
because the blackmailer uses the target merely as a means to her selfish ends and should be
crirninalized because criminalization provides the victim with "weapons" against the blackmailer
namely, "counter-leverage" and a righteous "willingness to angrily refuse the blackmailer's demands");
Gorr, supra note 5, at 46 ("If it is wrong for me to harm you or your property, then it is generally wrong
for me to seek advantage by threatening such harm." (citation omitted)); lsenbergh, supra note 1, at
1921 ("[W]hat is ultimately at issue in the prohibition of blackmail is transaction costs. There is no
other way to explain the law of blackmail."); Katz, supra note 1, at 1595-1601, 1605-06 Gust like a
robber, the blackmailer uses "swinish" threats to steal from her target); Lamond, supra note I , at 216,
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This Article will not discuss these proposals in any further detail
because they have already been amply covered in the literature? 1 But as a
234, 237-38 (blackmail produces the harm of interfering with the target's control or personal autonomy
without her valid consent); Lindgren,

supra note 1 1 , at 1 706-07 (the blackmailer uses leverage that
supra note 5, at 606 n.34 (same); Lindgren, supra note 7, at 36,
38, 40-43 (same); Lindgren, supra note l, at 923 (same); Lindgren, supra note 8, at 672, 694, 702--04
(same); McAdams, supra note 5, at 2249-64, 2278-86 (blackmail reduces or minimizes internalization,
adjudication, refinement, criticism, reform, and enforcement of norms); Owens, supra note 5, at 507belongs to somebody else); Lindgren,

13 (blackmail should be illegal because (a) generally speaking, the target cannot be reasonably certain
that the blackmailer is the only one who knows her secret, that these others will not disclose it, and
therefore that this particular blackmail transaction will succeed in delivering the benefit that she
desires-namely, non-disclosure of her secret; (b) it is therefore irrational for the target to enter into
such a transaction; and (c) the state should prohibit transactions into which it is irrational for at least
one party to enter); Waldron,

supra note 14, at 8 (the blackmailer should be punished "for exploiting

the community's sense of wrongdoing and turning that to his own advantage, even when that sense of
wrongdoing is misplaced or misapplied."); Williams, supra note 8, at 165, 168-70, 241--43 (blackmail
should be illegal if and only if the threat is not motivated by an honest belief that the demand is
justified).

See also generally Feinberg, supra note 5 (while the criminalization ofblackmail threats can

sometimes be justified because they are exploitative, there are different categories of blackmail threats,
one of which should be legalized and the rest of which should remain illegal on the ground that the
threatened disclosure is or should be contrary to criminal or civil law).
between (criminal) law and morality is complicated and controversial.

Of course, the relationship

Seminal accounts

are

offered

by, among others, Ronald Dworkin, H.L.A. Hart, Robert Nozick, and Joseph Raz. Within the universe
of the blackmail literature, see, for example, Lindgren,

supra note 7, at 39 ("Although the precise

relation of morality to criminal law is open to wide debate, most theories of the criminal law emphasize
morality very heavily.

. . .

Most theories combine some notion of immorality with some notion of

harm, disutility or inefficiency. . . . Immorality matters. . . . Again and again, morality comes up in
setting the boundaries of the criminal law."); Smilansky,

May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at 120

("I think that the moral and the legal are particularly entwined in the matter of blackmail. It is taken to
be so odious in part as a result of the educative or symbolic effect of its criminalization.

But the

criminalization of ordinary blackmail can hardly be understood completely apart from the independent
distaste that such practices create in most people.");

see also infra note 84.
supra note 1 , at 802-14; Boyle, supra note 1 1 , at
1 472-77; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 757-58; DeLong, supra note 1 1 , at 1689; Fletcher, supra
note 1 , at 1618; Hardin, supra note 5, at 1806; Isenbergh, supra note 1 , at 1 920-2 1 ; Lindgren, supra
note 14, at 1 984-86, 1987; Smith, supra note 5, at 863. For criticisms of (7) generally, see Scalise,
supra note 8, at 1 487-89. For criticisms of (8) generally, see Block, supra note 5, at 236; Block &
Gordon, supra note 12, at 47. For criticisms of Berman, see R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 765-67;
Scalise, supra note 8, at 1 492- 1 5 0 1 . For criticisms of Brown, see Block, Private Justice, supra note
1 2. For criticisms of Coase, see Block, Private Justice, supra note 12, at 20-2 1 , 27-28; Brown, supra
note 12, at 1952-53; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 755-56, 764-65; DeLong, supra note 1 1 , at
1 674-75 ; Lindgren, supra note 5, at 599-608. For criticisms of Epstein, see Berman, supra note 1, at
8 1 5-17; Block, supra note 1 , at 7; Block& Gordon, supra note 12, at 46--47; Brown, supra note 12, at
1 958-62; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 760; Katz, supra note 1 , at 1 577-78, 1603; Lindgren, supra
note 1, at 9 1 9-22; Lindgren, supra note 8, at 684-87. For criticisms of Feinberg, see Berman, supra
note 1 , at 821-22; Katz, supra note 1 , at 1579-80, 1602. For criticisms ofFletcher, see Berman, supra
note 1, at 824-26; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 764-65, 763-64; Lindgren, supra note 14, at 1978;
Smith, supra note 5, at 888-90, 897, 908--09. For criticisms of Ginsburg and Shechtman, see R.
Christopher, supra note 9, at 755-56. For criticisms of Isenbergh, see Block& McGee, supra note 8,
at 5 88-90, 597-600. For criticisms of Ginsburg, see Lindgren, supra note 5, at 601; Lindgren, supra
note 1 , at 9 1 1 ; Lindgren, supra note 8, at 695-97. For criticisms of Gorr, see R. Christopher, supra
note 9, at 762-63. For criticisms of .Katz, see Berman, supra note 1, at 827; K. Christopher, supra note
8, at 1 1 40; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 763-64; Lindgren, supra note 14, at 1 977; Scalise, supra
21

For criticisms of (5) generally, see Berman,
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whole, they tend to share one main problem: they do not fully resolve the

real Blackmail Paradox. While they may or may not provide good reasons
for thinking that blackmail should be criminalized, they fail to explain why
the six arguments for legalization are incorrect. At best, then, we are left
with

two

entirely

opposed

columns

of

arguments-those

for

criminalization and those against-and no means of deciding between
them. No justification of criminalization can be successful until it provides
these means.

For, again, these six pro-legalization arguments help to
generate the Blackmail Paradox. Without them, there would be nothing
contradicting our intuition that blackmail should be criminalized and

therefore no paradox in the first place.
What, then, are these six pro-legalization arguments?

The first

argument is simply that legal threatened action entails legal threat; that if
one may legally perform or refrain from performing a given action, then it
follows that she may offer to refrain from performing this action in
exchange for money. The second argument suggests that blackmail does
not instantiate any type of crime. The closest candidate, attempted theft,
simply does not work. It cannot be said that the blackmailer is attempting
to make the target pay for something to which she is already legally
entitled.

For,

ex

hypothesi, the target is not legally entitled to non

disclosure of her secret. The third argument suggests that blackmail threats
are no different than any other legally permissible threat.

Many legally

permissible threats are also profit-motivated and threaten an interest that
would be perfectly legal to harm. The fourth argument suggests that
blackmail transactions are no different than any other legally permissible
economic transaction.

The blackmailer simply offers to sell a service

non-disclosure of the target's secret-for a price that the target is willing to
pay. The fifth argument suggests that legalization of blackmail would help
to make blackmail targets better off than they currently are in a system that

note 8, at 1490. For criticisms of Lindgren, see Altman, supra note 4, at 1653-54; Berman, supra note
1, at 823-24; Block, Private Justice, supra note 12, at 20-2 1, 27-28; Block, supra note 5, at 237-39;
Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 52-53; Boyle, supra note 11, at 1481-82; Brown, supra note 12, at
1964--66; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 767-68; DeLong, supra note 11, at 1680-88; Fletcher, supra
note 1, at 1624-26; Gorr, supra note 5, at 60; Hardin, supra note 5, at 1792, 1805; Isenbergh, supra
note 1 , at 1917-18; Katz, supra note 1, at 1581, 1602; Scalise, supra note 8, at 1490; Smith, supra note
5, at 885-87, 907. Block and McGee defend Lindgren against lsenbergh's critique. Block & McGee,
supra note 8, at 586. For criticisms of McAdams, see Smith, supra note 5, at 911. For criticisms of
Nozick, see ROTIIBARD, supra note 12, at ch. 29, esp. 245-49; Berman, supra note 1, at 828-32; Block
& Gordon, supra note 12, at 48-50; Boyle, supra note 11, at 1479-81; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at
753-55; Isenbergh, supra note l, at 1921; Katz, supra note 1, at 1579, 1602-03; Lindgren, supra note
1, at 910-11; Lindgren, supra note 8, at 699-700; Murphy, supra note 5, at 158-59; Owens, supra note
5, at 504-05. For criticisms of Posner, see Berman, supra note 1, at 809-10; Block & Gordon, supra
note 12, at 39-44; Hardin, supra note 5, at 1806; Lindgren, supra note 14, at 1981-82. For criticisms
of Shavell, see R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 757. For criticisms of Smith, see R. Christopher, supra
note 9, at 760.
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criminalizes blackmail.

1 065

For while a system that criminalizes blackmail

encourages disclosure over blackmail proposals, a system that legalizes
blackmail encourages blackmail proposals over disclosure. And blackmail
targets are more likely to prefer blackmail proposals to disclosure.

For

they would rather have the option of paying for non-disclosure than not to
have it and simply be doomed to disclosure. Finally, the sixth argument
suggests that because silence-for-pay transactions that the target initiates
are legal and because they are substantively the same transactions that the
blackmailer typically initiates, the latter should also be legal.
This Article will take up the task that most, if not all, pro-criminalizers
have only partially accomplished: it will attempt to explain why all of
these pro-legalization arguments fail. While most of the arguments will be
critical, it will also incorporate a novel positive justification for
criminalization into its response to the second argument-i.e., the
argument that blackmail does not constitute attempted theft or any other
type of crime. It will argue that while blackmail threats do not qualify as
attempted theft, there is still another justification for criminalizing them.
The criminal law is largely concerned with protecting people against
deliberately inflicted harm to their supremely valued interests, to the
interests that they generally most highly value-namely life, physical well
being, emotional well-being, family, liberty, and property. That is why we
have criminal laws against homicide, manslaughter, rape, assault, battery,
kidnapping, unlawful imprisonment, and theft.
The fact that emotional well-being is among the supremely valued
interests explains why we have criminal laws against menacing,
harassment, and stalking (not to mention civil laws against intentional
infliction of emotional distress). Indeed, it is also the second reason that
we have criminal laws against extortionate threats, laws that are often
mixed among the larceny, coercion, menacing, harassment, and stalking
codes. These laws are all designed to protect people, in one way or
another, frotn undue fear and anxiety. As it turns out, for the same reason,
there should be laws against threats to reputation. For, like emotional well
being, reputation is also a supremely valued interest.

Its owners tend to

value it just as much as, if not more than, any of the other supremely
valued interests (life, physical well-being, etc.). So threats to it are just as
likely to inflict the same level of fear and anxiety as extortionate threats,
menacing, harassment, and stalking. And, if this likely consequence is
sufficient to criminalize these latter kinds of threats, then it is also
sufficient to criminalize the former kind of threats-i .e., blackmail threats.
Of course, objections may be raised against this argument.

For

example, one might argue that that reputation must not be as highly valued
as life, physical well-being, etc. because it is not legally protected in the
same way that they are. Again, true, but reputation-damaging disclosures
are perfectly legally permissible. In response to this objection, this Article
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will suggest that what has kept reputation out of the family of legally
protected interests is not the fact that it is less highly valued than life,
physical well-being, etc. Rather, what has kept reputation out of the family
of legally protected interests is the fact that it

happens to have a competitor

that society happens to regard as even more important-again, freedom of
speech. Life, physical well-being, etc. were simply lucky enough not to
have such competitors. So the fact that reputation is not legally protected
is not an indication that reputation is less highly valued than life, physical

well-being, etc. Rather, it is a reflection only of the fact that reputation is
less highly valued than freedom of speech. And this proposition is still
perfectly consistent with the possibility that reputation is equally, if not
more, valued than life, physical well-being, etc.
II.

FOUR INITIAL CLARIFICATIONS

Four initial clarifications are in order.

First, blackmail may be

conceived narrowly or broadly. The narrow conception incorporates only
informational blackmail-i.e., threats to (a) report incriminating
information (i.e ., information about another's illegal activity) to the
22
authorities
or (b) reveal embarrassing information (i.e., non
incriminating information that the target has violated a social or moral
norm and therefore the disclosure of which would likely harm the target's
reputation) to a third party or parties (e.g., one 's lover, spouse, family,
23
The broader conception incorporates

boss, and/or the public in general).

22 Blackmail threats to report incriminating information include threats to report incriminating
information about one's legal adversary in order to obtain a more favorable settlement from the
adversary. I owe this point to Judge Jed Rakoff.
23 See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF TilE CRIMINAL LAW : HARMLESS WRONGDOING
241 (1990) ("In ordinary discourse . . . blackmail has come to be identified with only one type of
wrongful coercion, namely the attempt to extract money or advantage by means of a threat to disclose
information about the victim, which, since it would embarrass or discredit him, he very much prefers to
keep secret."); RICHARD A POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 283 (1981) ("Blackmail is the
practice of threatening to disclose discreditable information about a person unless he pays the
blackmailer to suppress it."); Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 37 (restricting blackmail to "a demand
for money or other valuable consideration under the threat of exercising one's right of free speech by
publicizing someone else's secret without use of the threat of force or violence."); Friedman, supra note
3, at 11 1 0, 111 1 ; Gordon, supra note 7, at 1746 (referring to (b) above as "central case blackmail");
Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 42 ("Blackmail may be defined as the sale of information to an
individual who would be incriminated by its publication, and at first glance appears to be an efficient
method of private enforcement of the law (the moral as well as the positive law)."); Mack, supra note
12, at 274 (blackmail is "the acceptance of payment (in cash or kind) for not revealing damaging
information about somebody"); Scalise, supra note 8, at 1485 ("[B]lackmail, in formalistic terms,
should be defined as an otherwise legal threat to reveal coupled with an otherwise legal demand for
compensation not to reveal."). Feinberg acknowledges (a) and splits (b) into four different categories:
(b1) false accusations, (b2) information that an individual has performed legal but "underhanded"
actions, (b3) information that an individual has performed actions that are perfectly innocent but would
still be repudiated by others who are "benighted," and (b4) information that an individual, who has now
reformed her character, previously committed serious indiscretions. See Feinberg, supra note 5, at 85-
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Leo Katz argues

that it is possible to threaten to perform a legal but interest-injuring action
other than disclosing damaging information.25 Katz's examples include
threatening to: seduce another's fiance; persuade another's son that it is his
patriotic duty to volunteer for combat duty in Vietnam; give another's
high-spirited, risk-addicted nineteen-year-old daughter a motorcycle for
Christmas; hasten our ailing father's death by leaving the Catholic Church;
call a strike; flunk another on her exam; and cause bad blood at the next
faculty meeting.Z6 Still, Katz argues that it is not an accident that the
literature

concentrates

on

informational

blackmail:

"Most

immoral

misconduct at the noncriminal level is of an informational nature. If the
misconduct is more tangible than that, it probably is a crime. If it is less
tangible than that, it falls below the threshold of serious immorality."27

Whether or not Katz's explanation is correct, this Article will continue to
follow the literature' s lead and concentrate on informational blackmail as
well.
Second, the blackmail literature tends to distinguish between blackmail

and extortion.

It suggests, if not simply assumes, that, while extortion

involves a threat to perform an illegal action or legal action by illegal
means, blackmail involves a threat to perform a legal action by legal
means.28 It should be noted, however, that this distinction reflects only the
thinking of contemporary scholars, not contemporary jurisdictions or
history, according to which blackmail is/was a species of extortion.Z9

95. Gorr and Scalise follow Feinberg ' s classification. See Gorr, supra note 5, at 46-48; Scalise, supra
note 8, at 1 5 1 1 .
24

Some definitions of blackmail make no mention of information, no less legality/illegality. For

example, one authoritative source defines blackmail as simply "[a] threatening demand made without
justification." BLACK ' S LAW DICTIONARY 1 80 (8th ed. 2004).
25 Katz, supra note 1 , at 1567-68, 1 569-73, 1 578, 1 58 1 , 1 602; see also Berman, supra note 1 , at
852, 866-67; Lamond, supra note l , at 2 1 6; Lindgren, supra note 1 , at 923.
6
2 Katz, supra note 1, at 1567-68; see also Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1 6 1 9.
27 Katz, supra note 1, at 1 603.
28
See Alldridge, supra note 13, at 370-7 1 ; Berman, supra note 1 , at 806-07, 853; Block, Private
Justice, supra note 12, at 1 3; Block, supra note 1 , at 4; Block, supra note 8, at 6 1 -62; Block & Gordon,
supra note 12, at 38; R. Christopher, supra note 9, at 743-44; Feinberg, supra note 5, at 84; Friedman,
supra note 3, at 1 1 1 1 ; Gorr, supra note 5, at 59; Mack, supra note 12, at 274; Scalise, supra note 8, at
1 484, 1485, 1 506--07, 1 5 1 0-1 1 ; Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 5 1 ; Smilansky, May We Stop
Worrying, supra note 9, at 1 1 8 ; Smith, supra note 5, at 864.
29
See POSNER, supra note l , at 548-49; Alldridge, supra note 13, at 371-73, 38 1-83; Friedman,
supra note 3, at l l l l -12; James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion:
From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REv. 8 1 5, 88 1-82 ( 1 988). But see FEINBERG,
supra note 23, at 240 (''The terms 'blackmail ' and 'extortion ' . . . were once the names of quite distinct

crimes.").

The Model Penal Code categorizes blackmail under the heading of ''Theft by Extortion."

See supra note

2; see also Lindgren, supra note 1 1 , at 1 696 ("Coercive extortion is often called

blackmail, particularly where hush money is involved, but few blackmail statutes remain on the books.
Usually, blackmail behavior is covered under extortion, theft, or coercion statutes."); Smith, supra note
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Third, blackmail threats to disclose embarrassing information cannot
be

illegal

simply because they involve "trafficking in private
30
information."
Some perfectly legal transactions involve such trafficking.
These

transactions

typically involve either (a) the

sale

of private
1
information (e.g., by private detectives, police informers, and reportersi
or (b) the sale of secrecy (e.g., "an attorney's promise not to disclose the
confidences of a client, a departing employee's agreement not to disclose
the trade secrets of an employer, [and] a settling litifant's agreement not to
3
disclose what she learned during civil discovery.'').
Fourth, it is much easier to explain why blackmail threats to report
incriminating information are criminalized than it is to explain why
33

blackmail threats to report embarrassing information are criminalized.
Suppose

the

following:

"Troublemaker"

has

committed

a

crime,

Troublemaker's enemy-"Enemy"-has ample evidence to prove it, and
34
Enemy did not herself participate in this criminal activity.
The criminal
prohibition against blackmail threats to report incriminating information
derives from a moral and civic duty on Enemy' s part.

This derivation

proceeds in three parts. First, given that Troublemaker committed a crime,
it is Enemy's moral, civic, and arguably legal duty to report Troublemaker
35
to the authorities.
And the more morally reprehensible, the more morally
5, at 862 ("[B]lackmail or extortion can be defined as the obtaining of something of value by means of
a threat that is not associated with the immediate physical coercion required for robbery.").
30

Lindgren, supra note 8, at 688.

31

See Block, supra note I , at 6; Lindgren, supra note 8, at 688, 692, 705-06.

32

DeLong, supra note I I , at 1666; see also Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 52-53; Block &

McGee, supra note 8, at 582; Epstein, supra note 5, at 559, 5 6 1 ; Hardin, supra note 5, at 1807;
Isenbergh, supra note I , at 1 9 1 3; Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 42-43, 44-46; Lindgren, supra
note I , at 9 1 4-1 5; Owens, supra note 5, at 509.
33

Waldron, supra note 14, is more ambitious than I am insofar as he tries to provide one, all

encompassing explanation of why both blackmail threats to report incriminating information and
blackmail threats to disclose embarrassing information

are

criminalized. The justification offered here

for criminalizing blackmail threats to report incriminating information is very different from the
justification that will be provided in Parts IV.B-C for criminalizing blackmail threats to disclose
embarrassing information.
34

This example was borrowed in part from Lindgren, supra note 1 1 , at 1 70 1 , and Lindgren, supra

note 29, at 826-27.
35

Failure to report knowledge of another's crime constitutes misprision of felony.

supra note 9, at 57.

See Clark,

For different views of misprision, see Berman, supra note I , at 861 ("Modern

statutes have tended to ignore [misprision of felony] entirely" because silent witnesses may have
morally acceptable motives-namely, "fear of retaliation, . . . friendship and loyalty toward the
criminal, and . . . fear of the police."); Block, Private Justice, supra note 12, at 18 ("Why should a
person who has committed no crime go to prison for failure to report the misconduct of another?
Unless he has agreed to do so, this amounts to a

draft,

in effect forced enslavement, of police

personnel."); Block, supra note 1 , at 8 ("[W]hatever moral duty might be claimed to report the crimes
of another (and not to profit from them), nevertheless there is no basis for legally requiring that the
crimes of another should be reported.

Such positive duties-like the positive duty to be a good

Samaritan-have no place in criminal law."); Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 38 n.9 ("Just as the
law cannot properly compel the individual to be a good Samaritan, so can it not compel him to acquaint
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Second, the moral and civic duty to report

incriminating information entails a moral and civic duty not to conceal this

information-especially not for the self-serving purpose of making a
36
profit.
Such a profit would come at the expense of the public's interest in
37
law enforcement.
Third, the moral and civic duty not to conceal this

information for profit is sufficiently important to the public 's interest in
law enforcement that it translates into a legal duty not to conceal this
information for profit.

Because this argument adequately explains why blackmail threats to

report incriminating information are criminalized, the remainder of this

Article will assume that this issue has been dealt with and focus entirely on
what is the much harder problem-the question why blackmail threats to
disclose embarrassing information should also be criminalized.
the legal authorities with the fa cts concerning crimes he knows to have taken place. Turning in the
criminal may thus be an act over and above the call of duty, but it is not an act of duty itself.") ; Block

& McGee, supra note 8, at 595-96 ( keeping silent about another' s crime, whether or not for
compensation, does not amount to complicity); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 86-87 ([( a)] misprision of
felony requires "some affirmative act of concealment"; [(b)] similar to misprision of felony is
"compounding crime," which involves "accept[ing] money under an agreement not to . . . bring charges
against, a person [one] knows to have committed a crime" ; [(c)] misprision statutes have most likely
fallen into "desuetude . . . because of practical difficulties in enforcement, especially fear of underw orld
revenge"; and [(d)] even if we have no legal duty to report incriminating information, we still have a

civic duty to "cooperate with law enforcement" (internal q uot ation marks omitted)) ; Scalise, supra note
8, at 1 509 ( "The duty to report crime . . . is very limited . . . . [It] extends only to those acts which, if
one did not report, would result in one being rightfully considered an accomplice to the original
crime."); Waldron, supra note 14, at 8, 12-13, 20-2 1 (agrees with Feinberg that reporting incriminating
information is a civic duty, lists a number of other civic duties that we have, and suggests that there is
no reason in principle against criminalizing their violation).
Lindgren takes two different positions on this issue. On one hand, he states: "[U]nder fe deral law
we all have a duty to report people who commit federal felonies. Yet it would still be extortion for a
private citizen to threaten to report a federal felon unless he is paid off, despite the threatener' s breach
of his legal duty to report." Lindgren, supra note 1 1, at 170 l. On the other hand, he st ates: "In most
j urisdictions, [a church secretary who has been raped by an evangelist] may . . . threaten to reveal the
information to the police or the press unless he pays restitution."

Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605 &

n.30. Still, Lindgren' s latter point does not necessarily contradict his former point. For while the
former concerns federal felonies, the latter concerns state crimes. See Lindgren, supra note 1 1, at 1 70 1
n.2 1 ; Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605 n.30.
36

This last clause arg uably lends some support to Berman' s thesis that motives are important in

accounting for the illegality of blackmail. Berman, supra note 1, at 797-98.
37

See Feinberg, supra note 5, at 86 ("No citizen

can

be allowed to barter away his duties for

personal advantage, or even to offer to do so (the offer in this case being very much like an attempt at
crime, itself punishable).") ; Friedman, supra note 3, at 1 1 12

("If a person knows about a crime, she has

a duty to report it to the authorities, and not to use the knowledge for private gain, selling silence to the
criminal for cash."); Gorr, supra note 5, at 48, 5 1, 56--57, 62; Isenbergh, supra not e 1, at 1927-29;
Mwphy, supra note 5, at 1 65 ; Smith, supra note 5, at 864-QS .

Waldron proposes an alternative

explanation: the blackmailer should be punished "roughly for the same reason that an enterprising
trader' s offer to purchase stolen goods should be condemned: he is proposing to make a profi t out of
someone else' s wrongdoing." Waldron, supra note 1 4, at 7, 1 1 -1 8 . Waldron then attempts to broaden
his theory from situations in which the target has committed wrongdoing to more difficult situations in
which the target has violated a morally questionable community norm. /d. at 24-30.
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III. S IX ARGUMENTS FOR LEGALIZING BLACKMAIL
This section will explicate the six strongest arguments for legalizing
blackmail.
A. Legal Threatened Action Entails Legal Threat
Walter Block and David Gordon argue that legal threatened action
entail s legal threat.38 As long as the threatened action is legal, the threat
itself should be legal as well. More precisely, as long

as

an individual has

the right to perform or refrain from performing a particular action A, she
has the right to threaten to perform A. And the right to threaten to perform
A is equivalent to the right to demand payment in exchange for refraining
from performing A. 39
B . Blackmail Threats Are Not Attempted Theft
The argument in this section is that the legality of disclosure entails
that a blackmail threat to disclose does not constitute attempted theft. And
since attempted theft seems to be the only plausible candidate for the type
of crime that blackmail might instantiate, blackmail should not be

criminalized.

Consider, first, the extortionate threat. The extortionate threat involves

one of two kinds of illegality.

It is either a threat to perform an illegal

action (e.g., to inflict non-immediate violence) or a threat to perform an

action that would involve illegal means (e.g., to disclose embarrassing
information that was illegally obtained).40 It is easy enough to see why the
actual carrying out of either kind of threat-i.e., extortion itself-is

illegal.41 For the target's freedoms from violence and invasion of privacy
38

Block & Gordon, supra note

12, at 38.
See id. at 38, 44-45; see also ROTHBARD, supra note 12, at 124; Block, Private Justice, supra
note 12, at 12; Block, supra note 5, at 225; Kipnis, supra note 1 , at 19; Owens, supra note 5, at 504.
39

40 Threats to reveal to a third party's private information (e.g., information about one's credit
rating, social security number, home address, or phone numbers) or representations (photographs or
recordings) of private activity (e.g., having sex with one's wife or taking a shower) are not commonly
discussed in the blackmail literature most likely because privacy laws forbid such disclosure or the
means by which such information or representations were obtained, in which case threats to disclose
such information or representations constitute extortion rather than blackmail. Kent Greenawalt
suggests that some threats to perform criminal action�namely, minor criminal actions like trespass
should be constitutionally protected speech. Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of
Speech, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1081, 1 100, 1108, 1 12 1 ( 1984); see also GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at

255.

41

Black 's Law Dictionary defines extortion as the "act or practice of obtaining something or

compelling some action by illegal means, as by force or coercion." BLACK'S LAW DICfiONARY, supra
note

24, at 266. Likewise, the Hobbs Act, 1 8 U.S.C. § 195 1 (2000), which is based largely on New

York's criminal code, states in relevant part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or
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She has the legal right not to have these freedoms

infringed by others. And this point explains why mere threats to commit

extortion are illegal. If the extortionist comes along and demands money

in exchange for continued enjoyment of any of these freedoms, she is
committing attempted theft. She is attempting to coerce42 the target into

paying for something to which the target is already legally entitled and

therefore something for which the target does not have to pay.43

Now consider a blackmail threat-i.e., a threat to perform an otherwise
legal action by legal means. The classic blackmailer threatens her target
with disclosure of true and legally obtained but damaging information
about the target.44 Like the extortionate threat, this kind of threat is also

threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a
plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined . . .
or imprisoned . . . or both.
(b) As used in this section-.
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of
official right.
See also Block, supra note 5, at 228; Block & McGee, supra note 8, at 571; Ginsburg &
Shechtman, supra note 1 1, at 1852, 1 858; Gorr, supra note 5, at 4�; Isenbergh, supra note l , at
1 905-06; Lindgren, supra note 29, at 825; Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 5 1 .
42 By coerce, I mean presenting a target with the option of either performing a certain action or
facing a highly probable risk of being subjected to what the coercer correctly believes the target will
perceive as a harm. The more serious the harm, the more coercive the option (or threat). See Altman,
supra note 4, at 1 642 ("Threats deprive the recipient of an important option available in some
alternative situation. . . . The removal of important available options to alter someone's actions is
coercion."); Comment, Coercion, Blackmail, and the Limits of Protected Speech, 1 3 1 U. PA. L. REv.
1 469, 1472-73 ( 1 983) ("A coercive speech analysis would justify prosecution of a gangster under a
criminal coercion statute if the gangster threatened to break a tavern owner's legs unless he voted for a
certain political candidate. The threat forces the tavern owner to choose between two things-the right
to be free from physical assault and the right to vote according to individual conscience-when the
tavern owner has a legitimate claim to both things." (citation omitted)); Greenawalt, supra note 40, at
1096 ("One person coerces another by putting him under such great psychological pressure that a
mtional decision is impossible, by creating unfair conditions of choice, or by manipulating belief about
relevant facts; informing someone of true but disquieting facts beyond one's control is clearly not to ·
coerce.").
43 Greenawalt offers a different explanation:
[A]nother basis for punishing a warning threat is the wrongfulness of the harm
threatened. If the threatened harm is imminent and could itself achieve the
threatener's objective, as when immediate physical force is threatened, the threat
should be viewed like the harm itself, even if the particular threatener is inclined
naturally to use force to get his way.
GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 253-54.
44 If the information that the blackmailer threatened to disclose were false, then the blackmailer
would be threatening to perform the illegal act of defamation or false accusation, in which case she
would be not a blackmailer but an extortionist. See Feinberg, supra note 5, at 94; Gorr, supra note 5, at
47; Lindgren, supra note 5, at 600; Scalise, supra note 8, at 1 507-09, 1 5 1 3 ; Smilansky, Blackmail,
supra note 9, at 1 5 1 ; see also ROTHBARD, supra note 12, at 1 26-28 (stands alone in arguing that libel
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illegal if it is conj oined with a demand for money in exchange for
·

concealment.

But we cannot offer the same kind of j ustification for its
criminalization.45 We cannot say that, like extortionate threats, blackmail

threats also amount to attempted theft.

For the blackmailer is not

attempting to make the target pay to continue enjoying an interest
freedom from injury to reputation-to which she is already legally entitled.
The fact of the matter is that the target is not legally entitled to freedom
from injury to reputation. As long as the blackmailer's information about
the target is true and legally obtained, she is within her legal rights to
disclose it to whomever she wants, no matter how much injury this
disclosure will cause to the target's reputation.46
The natural response to this argument is:

Fine, blackmail is not

attempted theft. But attempted theft is not the only possible type of crime
that blackmail might instantiate. There are plenty of other types of crime
that might work. The problem with this response, however, is that there
does seem to be any other such type of crime out there. As Walter Block
should be perfectly legal ( ! !)); Smith, supra note 5, at 877-78 (discussing the connection between libel
and blackmail).
45 Contrary to several scholars.
See D. Campbell, supra note 20, at 885, 887-92 (blackmail
transactions start out with a coercive proposal, a proposal that forces the target to choose between two
of her rights); Evans, supra note 5, at 89 ("[B)Iackmail is illicit because it harms the victim by extorting
money from him."); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 90-92 (it is not paradoxical to criminalize blackmail
threats because the threatened action, disclosure, generally violates privacy torts, in which case the
blackmail threat constitutes "an attempt at theft (by extortion)"); Gordon, supra note 7, at 1769 (''The
central case blackmailer . . . seeks to extract something from the victim that is properly the victim's,
usually money, or to make the victim do something (for example, sleep with him) that is ordinarily a
behavior that the victim is at liberty not to engage in."); Gorr, supra note 5, at 53, 54 (blackmail
involving legal but underhanded practices amounts to theft); Murphy, supra note 5, at 1 59-60 (there is
a "plausible ring" to the notion that part of what makes the blackmail threat wrong is that it involves
"trying to sell back to the victim something which is really his already (his life)"); Posner, supra note 5,
at 1834-35 (in some cases, blackmail is "the economic equivalent of theft"; so we may no more
legalize blackmail on the basis of its speculated benefits than we may legalize extortion on the basis of
its speculated benefits).
46 See Block, supra note l , at 5, 8; Block, supra note 5, at 234, 242-45; Block, supra note 8, at 73
("[B]Iackmail is not akin to theft, not an invasive act, nor threat thereof . . . ."); Block & McGee, supra
note 8, at 572 (blackmail and extortion "resemble each other only superficially. They are as distinct as
rape and seduction or trade and robbery." (citation omitted)); Katz, supra note l, at 1576 ("[The
robber) sells back what he doesn't own, the victim's life and limb. Not so the blackmailer threatening
to disclose the victim's infidelity. The victim doesn't own the right to control the blackmailer's
communications with his wife; the blackmailer does. The blackmailer, unlike the robber, is selling
something he owns. Or so it seems."); Levin, supra note 3, at 12 (the blackmail target does not "own"
his marriage; a "voluntary association such as a marriage, terminable by either partner, belongs to
neither . . . . Nor . . . is blackmail extortion. . . . Since you have a right not to have your arm broken,
refrainment from assault is not [the vendor's] to sell. I on the other hand have no duty to refrain from
showing your wife my videotape. The tape is mine to do with as I please."); Lindgren, supra note 5, at
599 ("[P)recisely what makes blackmail paradoxical . . . [is the fact that] the victim does not own or
control the information."). But see Lindgren, supra note 7, at 37 ("[M]ost states treat blackmail as a
species of theft . . . . Thus a blackmail threat typically violates the victim's civil right to keep his
property and be free of duress.").
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argues, at least according to libertarianism, the only other justifications for

criminalization in addition to (attempted) theft are other personal and
47
property invasions such as fraud and force.
And they do not work either.
Blackmail does not necessarily involve fraud, at least not by the
blackmailer against the target.48 And while it may involve pressure on the

target to pay for non-disclosure, this pressure does not amount to force or
coercion. For the target's option of refraining from· paying and thereby
risking disclosure is not necessarily so horrible that a reasonable person
49
So blackmail is a square peg
could not be expected to choose it.

47

See, e.g., Block, Private Justice, supra note 1 2 , at I1 ; Block, supra note I , at 3 .

48

E pstein argues that blackmai l should be c ri minal because it i nvolves fraud and dec eit. E pstei n,

supra note 5, at 565�6. But thi s fraud and deceit is perpetrated not-a s is commonly thought-by the
b lackmai ler against her target but rather by the target against the thi rd party from whom she wishes to
hide i nformati on. Id at 563�6; see also Alldridge, supra note 1 3 , at 369-70 (sympathizing with
E pstei n's vi ew that the blackmai l target is more morally culpab le than the b lac kmailer i nsofar as the
former perpetrates fraud against third parties an d the latter only asks for payment "for j oining in the
fraud."); Scalise, supra note 8, at 1 5 1 5 ("[I] t is arguable that the party engaging in malicious revelation
does society a service by preventing the continual exercise of fraud upon memb ers of the
community."); Smith, supra note 5 , at 888 (Epstein "foc uses

on

excessively on the b lackmai ler's

acti ons" and neglects the much greater harm that b lac kmai l i nduc es the target to i nflict on others (or
herself)).

49 See Block, Private Justice, supra note 1 2 , at I9-20; Block, supra note I, at 5; Block & Gordon,
supra note 12, at 38; Brown, supra note 1 2 , at 1950 n.32 ("That the blac kmailee may be fac ed with a

hard c hoic e between the consequences of di sc losure and paying the blac kmailer does not nec essari ly
make the b lac kmai l any more coercive than the choice facing many parties to wholly legi timate
ec onomic transactions."); Levin, supra note 3 , at 1 t ("[1]he sale of si lence i nvolves no c oerci on, for
however the negoti ati ons for it begin, the buyer remains free to choose between two bundles of goods.
You can have my silence and be out a certain amount of money, or keep the money and be out one
marriage. It is your move."); Murphy, supra note 5, at 156 (the blac kmailer's threats are not obviously
coercive); Posner, supra note 5 , at 1 8 1 8 ("Blackmai l is, in the usual case, a voluntary transaction
betw een competent adults."). But see Berman, supra note 1 , at 852 ( "(1] he b lac kmai l victim is just as
coerc ed as the holdup vic tim."); D. Campbell, supra note 20, at 887-92 (the b lackmai ler c oerces the
target to c hoose between two rights, her right to her money and her right to keep her secret); Feinberg,
supra note 5 , at 84 (the target's "choic e to pay the b lac kmai ler is considerably less than fully
voluntary"); Lamond, supra note 1 , at 2 1 6 , 2 1 8-23 , 232-33, 237-3 8 (a blackmai ler's threat
"i nvalidates the victim' s c onsenf' to deprivation of property and interferenc e with personal autonomy;
offers in-depth di scussion of c oercion); Lindgren, supra note 14, at 1976, 1977, 1986, 1 988-89
(sympathizing with Katz' s proposal that c oercion, and therefore blac kmail, are properl y cri mi nalized
although they "i ncrease[ ] a victi m's opti ons and follow [ ] a vic ti m's preferences"); Lindgren, supra
note 7 , at 38 ("Although the victim may agree with the blackmailer, that does not und�rcut society's
c onsensus that the blackmailer i s taking unfair advantage of the vic ti m."). For intermedi ate posi tions,
see Altman, supra note 4, at 1641-43, 1 645-46 (while some blackmai l should be criminal because i t
i nvolves coercion o r exploitati on, rarer instanc es of blackmai l that do not involve c oercion or
exploitation should be criminal for independent moral and practic al reasons); Sc alise, supra note 8, at
1 504-05 ("Whi le the ac quiescenc e of the blackmailee i s not a produc t of c oercion, the b lackmailee
clearly has no reasonable alternative other than to ac quiesc e. Bec ause the b lac kmai l situati on leaves
the b lackmailee with no reasonab le alternative, it c learly limits the liberty of the acquiescing party."
(internal citation omi tted)) . Of c ourse, in order to constitute criminally puni shable c oercion, the threat
must be sufficiently coercive. Consi der, for example, the threat ''your money or I will not like you
anymore." No matter who the threat-maker is, losing her affection cannot be so bad that the target
cannot be reasonably expec ted to ri sk losing i t in order to hold on to her money. See GREENAWALT,
supra note 6, at 1 00-01 ; Block & McGee, supra note 8, at 577; Isenb ergh, supra note I , at 1 910; Katz,
supra note I, at 1 597, 1 605-07; Lamond, supra note I, at 223.
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It does fi t any niche in the

As we saw above, the only reason why extortionate threats of non
immediate violence are criminalized is because they amount to attempted
theft, attempts to make individuals pay for what they are already legally
entitled to. No other justification for criminalizing these threats exists.
Since this justification does not equally apply to blackmail threats to
disclose embarrassing information, and since this was the most plausible
such justification, it follows that blackmail must be de-criminalized.

C. Blackmail Threats Belong to the Family ofLegally Permissible Threats
Blackmail threats seem to fit perfectly well into the larger family of
5°
legally permissible threats.
Clearly, blackmail cannot be condemned
simply on the ground that the blackmailer is making a profit-motivated

threat.

For the permissibility, no less desirability, of making profit

motivated threats lies at the heart of contract law, capitalism, and power
51
negotiations.
Examples of such legally permissible threats include:

every seller's implicit threat not to sell a given product or service, even if it
5
is desperately needed or desired, unless paid the asking price; 2 consumer
53
54
pressure through advertising; consumer boycotts; a seller's threat to sell
50

Indeed, not all threats

are

criminal

or

even immoral See Fletcher, supra note 1 , at 1 6 1 8-19,

1621; Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 1 108; Lamond, supra note 1, at 230; Lindgren, supra note 14, at
1 986; Murphy, supra note 5, at 158; Shaven, supra note 1 1 , at 1893-94.
51

See GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1 00; Block, supra note 8, at 72 ("[A]s Adam Smith

concluded, it is 'not from benevolence ' that many economic actors accomplish benefic ial, but
unintended goals. And so it is with the blackmailer."); Murphy, supra note 5, at 160, 166; see also
Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 1 099 .
52 See FEINBERG, supra note 23, at 240; GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1 00; Altman, supra note
4, at 1658-59 (''rescue bargains," hard bargains for desperately needed products or services, are not
exploitative or coercive); Berman, supra note l , at 800--0 2, 8 1 9; Block, supra note 5, at 235-36, 239;
Boyle, supra note 1 1 , at 1417, 1419, 1 428, 1471, 1477; Brown, supra note 1 2, at 1973; D. Campbell,
supra note 20, at 886-92 (blackmail cannot be distinguished from legitimate economic transactions on

the basis that only the former involves threats because the latter may involve threats as well); DeLong,
supra note 1 1 , at 1 666; Epstein, supra note 5, at 557-58 (explaining why threats are essential to

successful commerce); Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1 6 1 9, 1625; Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 1 1 , at
1 849; Hardin, supra note 5, at 1 792-93, 1 795, 1 797, 1 803--05, 1 807, 1 8 1 3-14 (whether or not "mutual
advantage" or "exchange" blackmail should be legal depends not on an a priori analysis of individual
blackmail transactions but rather on an empirical analysis of how blackmail transactions interact with
laws, institutions, and other kinds of transactions); Isenbergh, supra note 1 , at 1 906, 192 1 ; Lindgren,
supra note 8, at 701--02 (the "main problem" of the Blackmail Paradox is to explain the difference

between blackmail and "legitimate bargaining"); Mack, supra note 12; Murphy, supra note 5, at 1 5660 (asking why blackmail threats are illegal when hard bargains are legal); Shavell, supra note 1 1 , at
1901 (explaining why threats are essential to successful commerce); Smilansky, May We Stop
Worrying, supra note 9, at 1 1 6-17; Smith, supra note 5, at 865, 892.
53

See Boyle, supra note 1 1 , at 1477-78.

54

See Mack, supra note 12, at 28 1-83; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 256-57; Block,

supra note 8, at 66-68; Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 1 1 1 5; Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra

note 9, at 1 1 8. Smilansky still sees a psychological difference between the targets of boycotts and the
targets of blackmail; the rich and powerful are seriously ''frightened" only by the latter. Smi1ansky,
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55

a
56
buyer's threat to a seller that she will not buy unless the price is lowered;
a company' s threat to extend business into a new area unless potential
57
competitors in that area pay it the money that it could expect to make;
employers' threats to lay off employees even if these layoffs would impose
5
an "intolerable financial burden" on them; 8 an em�loyee' s threat to quit

her job unless she receives a pay raise or promotion; 9 employee strikes for
60
better wages or working conditions;
a neighbor' s threat to build or
1
maintain a property nuisance unless paid compensation;6 a politician's
threat to cut funding to groups that do not support her;62 threats of force or
3
economic sanctions in international relations;6 prosecutors ' threats to
4
argue for harsher counts or sentencing unless suspects cooperate;6 and a
civilian's threat to bring a legitimate lawsuit (i.e., a lawsuit based on a
65
genuinely believed "claim of right") unless paid compensation.
Blackmail, supra note 9, at 152: Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at l l 8-19.

Gorr

argues that the distinction between blackmail and boycotts cannot be reduced to the difference between
a threat of harm and a threat of withholding benefits. Gorr, supra note 5, at 58.
55

See Epstein, supra note 5, at 557; Isenbergh, supra note I, at 1906; see also Block & McGee,

supra note 8, at 57 1 ; Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 1 1 , at 1849.
56

Shavell, supra note 1 1 , at 1893.

51

See A.H. Campbell, supra note 20, at 388, 390. Smilansky thinks that this threat is arguably

blackmail. See Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 5 1 ; Srnilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra
note 9, at 1 1 7-18.
5

8

59

See Boyle, supra note 1 1 , at 1478; Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at 1 18 .
See A.H. Campbell, supra note 20, at 388; Coase, supra note 1 1 , at 664; Isenbergh, supra note

1 , at 1906; Williams, supra note 8, at 1 72.
60

61

See GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1 00; Williams, supra note 8, at 1 72.
See KATZ, supra note 8, at 1 33; NOZICK, supra note 1 8, at 84-85; ROTHBARD, supra note 12,

at 246 (using this point to criticize Nozick); Berman, supra note 1, at 866 n.230 (admitting that this
situation may constitute an exception to his evidentiary theory of blackmail); A.H. Campbell, supra
note 20, at 388; Coase, supra note 1 1 , at 664, 670-7 1 ; Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 1 1 , at 186164; Goodhart, supra note 7, at 440; Isenbergh, supra note l, at 1906, 1 920-22; Lindgren, supra note 8,
at 696, 70 1 ; Shavell, supra note I I , at 1893-94; Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 52; WiJliams,
supra note 8, at 172. Isenbergh points out that "if [the blackmailer] has no interest in building for its

own sake and wants only to profit from selling an easement to [the target], [the blackmailer]' s
announced intention to build is blackmail as defined in the Model Penal Code." Isenbergh, supra note
l , at 192 1-22. Block and McGee criticize Isenbergh on this issue. Block & McGee, supra note 8, at
571 590-9 1 .
' 2
6 See Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 52; Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note
9, at 1 1 8.
63

See sources cited supra note 62.

64

See Hardin, supra note 5, at 1790-9 1.

65

See Block, supra note 8, at 72; A.H. Campbell, supra note 20, at 387-88; Fletcher, supra note

1, at 1 6 1 8; Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605; Lindgren, supra note 1 , at 9 1 0- l l , 920; Lindgren, supra
note 8, at 688, 71 3-14; Shavell, supra note 1 1 , at 1893, 1901; Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at
!52; Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at 1 1 8; Smith, supra note 5, at 880; Waldron,
supra note 14, at 17-18; Williams, supra note 8, at 1 64-68; see also Berman, supra note 1, at 863

(threats to bring legitimate lawsuits are more morally acceptable in civil Jaw than in criminal law);
Gordon, supra note 7, at 1776 (referring to "anecdotal evidence . . . suggesting that persons threatened
with blackmail may have some hope of maintaining confidentiality even if they report the crime.");
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Blackmail threats belong in this list because they share the same basic
characteristics: they too (a) are profit-motivated, or at least self-interest
66
motivated, and (b) threaten actions that are perfectly legal to carry out.
D. Blackmail Constitutes an Ordinary Economic Transaction

It has been argued that the transaction between the blackmailer and the
target is wasteful and inefficient-an "unproductive exchange" in Robert
67
Blackmail transactions are thought to be wasteful and

Nozick's words.

inefficient because only one of the two parties receives a positive benefit
from the blackmail transaction.

While the blackmailer profits, the

blackmail target suffers net harm. She has (a) paid money and (b) gained
nothing; her secret is just as concealed before the transaction as afterward.
But this argument assumes without j ustification that the proper
baseline against which to compare the target's present situation (after
paying off the blackmailer) is the target's situation before the blackmailer
threatened her.

One might very plausibly argue that the proper baseline

should instead be the target's situation just after the blackmailer threatened
her. Compared with this situation, the target is better of[ after she pays off
the blackmailer.

Indeed, the notion that the blackmailer's proposal is a

threat obscures the fact that it is equally an offer-an offer to conceal the
68
reputation-damaging information if payment is made.
Just as with any
other economic transaction, the target is being offered something that she
desires-in this case, concealment-in exchange for payment.

So if she

accepts this offer, she is arguably better off than she would have been in a
situation where the blackmailer knew her secret and she did not receive the
69

blackmailer's agreement to conceal.

supra note 1 5, at 43 (referring to this threat as "lawful bribery"); Posner, supra note
1828 (threatening to bring a civil lawsuit unless paid off is less likely to be considered blackmail

Landes & Posner,

5,

at

than threatening to report incriminating information unless paid off because the former allows the
defendant a greater opportunity to maintain confidentiality).
66

If this argument were correct, blackmail threats would be constitutionally protected · speech.

But Greenawalt argues that blackmail threats are not protected speech because they are "situation
altering" and situation-altering speech is not supported by any of the various justifications underlying
freedom of speech. Greenawalt, supra note 40, at
6
7
68

at

109 1-95, 1098-l lOO, l l03.
See proposition (5), supra note 2 1 , and accompanying text.
For two different accounts of the difference between threats and offers, see

1574

Katz, supra note

l,

(the distinction between threats and offers is that while the former "shrink" the target's

opportunity set, the latter enlarge the target 's opportunity set); and Lamond,

supra

note l , at

225-27

(what distinguishes threats and offers is that offers anticipate welcome consequences and threats
anticipate unwelcome consequences, where welcomeness or unwelcomeness is to be analyzed terms of
the target's subjective interests or desires (for positive actions) and objective baselines or norms (for
omissions)).

See GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 99; ROTHBARD, supra note 12, at 246 ("Jones is paying not
not making him worse off. But surely the latter is also a
productive contract, because Jones is still better off making the exchange than he would have been if
the exchange were not made."); Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 38-39 ("The payment extracted
69

for Smith's making him better off, but for
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One might object that while the blackmail target pays for concealment,
which is a kind of omission., the buyer in an ordinary economic transaction
70
But this point
pays for a positive something, either a product or service.
fails to undermine the argument above because (a) the blackmailer's
omission to disclose is itself a service and (b) it is perfectly legal in some
situations for people to pay others to preserve their secrets.

As was

mentioned in Part II, clients pay their attorneys, among other things, to
preserve their confidences, and employees formally agree that they will not
directly or indirectly reveal their employers'
employers' competitors.

trade secrets to their

Moreover, Richard Posner points out that it is

perfectly legal to "conduct research into people's pasts and sell the results
71
So why should it be any less legal, no less criminal,
to the newspaper."
72
to try to sell such research to the subject herself?
E.

Legalization Would Help to Make Blackmail Targets Better Off
The argument in Part ill. D above was that blackmail transactions

(legal or not) help to make blackmail targets better off than they were prior

must be worth Jess to the victim than the costs of having his secret uncovered."); Evans, supra note 5,
at 92 ("[H]ow can it be illegal to give the victim the choice of being put in a better position than if the
blackmailer had harmed him in a lawful manner?"); Hardin, supra note 5, at 1 806; Katz, supra note 1 ,
at 1 598 ("If revealing [another's marital] infidelities is only a minor immorality, then how can the
taking of money which the victim prefers to that minor immorality be anything more than a minor
immorality itself?"); Levin, supra note 3, at 12 ("In fact, the straying husband does get something from
the blackmailer: better odds that his wife will stay with him than would obtain without the
blackmailer's silence."); Lindgren, supra note 8, at 691 (a successful blackmail transaction is arguably
Jess an invasion of privacy than actual disclosure); Owens, supra note 5, at 502. According to some
scholars, whatever we might think about "ordinary" blackmail, "market-price" blackmail-the situation
in which an author offers the subject of her prospective publication "market price" in exchange for
omitting embarrassing information about the subject-constitutes an ordinary economic transaction and
therefore should be legalized. See ROTHBARD, supra note 12, at 125; Berman, supra note 1 , at 857-60
(after offering a complicated analysis of market-price blackmail, concluding: ''the particular reasons for
legalizing the unconditional sale by [the blackmailer] to [a tabloid] should, on consequentialist
reasoning, entail also legalizing the conditional sale offer by [the blackmailer] to [the target].");
Murphy, supra note 5, at 164-65 (market-price blackmail transactions should be legalized for "public
persons"). But see POSNER, supra note 1 , at 546-47 (supporting this argument but calling it
"incomplete" because it ignores blackmail's "regulatory aspect"); Altman, supra note 4, at 1647-49
(while market-price blackmail, not to mention ''payer-initiated bargains," is "less wrong than most
blackmail," it should still be prohibited for "prophylactic reasons"-i.e., because such transactions are
(a) hard to detect or distinguish from regular blackmail and (b) difficult to enforce); Lindgren, supra
note 8, at 693-94 (criticizing Murphy's theory). Other scholars who discuss market-price blackmail
include: Owens, supra note 5, at 501-{)3; and Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note 9, at 1 161 7.
70

See Gorr, supra note 5, at 58 (while the blackmailer threatens to cause harm (the flip side of

which is offering to refrain from inflicting this harm for money), the selJer in an ordinary commercial
transaction threatens (only) to withhold a positive benefit (the flip side of which is offering to confer
this benefit for money)).
71 POSNER, supra note 23, at 284.
72

Id
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to the transactions. For they gain something that they did not have before
making payment-namely, the blackmailer's agreement to conceal their
secret.

The argument in this section is that

legalization

of blackmail

transactions would make blackmail targets better off than they are in the
current system, a system that criminalizes blackmail. For, whether or not
blackmail is legal, there will always be a huge market for reputation
damaging information about not only public figures but also many private
73
And how this market operates will largely depend on

individuals as well.

whether or not blackmail is legal. On the one hand, if there is a law against
blackmail, then many would-be blackmailers will simply bypass the targets
and instead go straight to the public with their reputation-damaging
information.

On the other hand, if there were

no

law against blackmail,

then these same would-be blackmailers would be much more likely to offer
their targets secrecy in exchange for money.

And many, if not most,

targets would prefer the latter situation. For in the latter situation, they at
least have the option of purchasing non-disclosure. In the former situation,
74
they have no such option.
73

See Lindgren, supra note 8, at 691-93; Mack, supra note 12, at 280-8 1 . All else being equal,

we are generally a bit less sympathetic to public figures than we are to private individuals. There are
three reasons. First, we tend to think that public figures assumed the risk when they entered the public
arena with the knowledge that, by so entering, they would risk exposing their lives and mistakes to the
world. Second, we may be jealous of their fame, power, and money. Third, rightly or wrongly, we
regard this fame, power, and money as legitimate compensation for their consequent loss of privacy.
74

See ROTHBARD, supra note 1 2, at 1 24-25; Altman, supra note 4, at 1650; Berman, supra note

I , at 828-29; Block, supra note 8, at 63, 69; Block & Gordon, supra note 12, at 39; Block & McGee,
supra note 8, at 584; Boyle, supra note I I , at 1475, 1480; DeLong, supra note 1 1 , at 1 663-64, 1673
(this argument is what makes the Blackmail Paradox a paradox); Gordon, supra note 7, at 1 779 {this
argument depends on the "image" of a blackmail victim who prefers payment to disclosure and
surreptitiously ignores the image on which the prohibition of blackmail rests-namely, "one who is put
into mental pain and fear by blackmail threats, but who will nevertheless have no truck with
dishonor."); Gorr, supra note 5, at 62 ("Although . . . we would have to acknowledge that there

are

likely to be some regrettable instances in which the victim will be disadvantaged by a ban on
blackmail, such a ban is still justified since permitting blackmail would almost certainly produce far
more injustice."); Hardin, supra note 5, at 1 794; Katz, supra note 1 , at 1595-97 (the blackmailer is
blameworthy even if she accommodates the target's preference and allows her to purchase silence or
non-disclosure); Lindgren, supra note 14, at 1987 (market-price blackmail is still blackmail and
therefore should still be illegal); Mack, supra note 1 2, at 275; Murphy, supra note 5, at 15 8-59, 1 60,

1 64-65 (accepting this argument to some extent); Owens, supra note 5, at 501-02; Posner, supra note
5, at 1 84 1 ; Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 1 5 1 ; Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying, supra note
9, at 1 1 7.
Notice, this argument assumes that the reputation-damaging information in question is not
something that citizens clearly have a right to know, information such as the fact that a public official
violated her public duty. For legalizing blackmail in these situations would violate citizens' right to
know. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 165. Lindgren criticizes Murphy on this point. Lindgren, supra
note 8, at 694.
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If Target-Initiated Blackmail is Legal, then Blackmailer-Initiated
Blackmail Should Also Be Legal

As blackmail statutes stand, Blackmailer cannot be guilty of blackmail
So if Target correctly
unless she initiates the blackmail transaction.

believes that Blackmailer possesses damaging information about Target,
approaches Blackmailer, offers to purchase Blackmailer's silence, and
Blackmailer agrees, no crime has taken place. Target has committed a
form of legal bribery.

But if such a transaction is legal, then the reverse

transaction-i.e., the transaction in which Blackmailer first approaches

Target and offers to keep silent about Target's secret in exchange for
money-should also be legal.
For they are substantively the same
transaction. It does not matter who first approached whom. That is merely
a formal consideration. What matters is that, in both situations, Target is
7
equally purchasing Blackmailer's silence. 5

IV. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE SIX ARGUMENTS FOR
LEGALIZING BLACKMAIL
This section will challenge the six arguments in Part III for legalizing
blackmail.
1s

See DeLong, supra note 1 1 , at 1664-65 ((a) no solution to the Blackmail Paradox can be

successful unless it also solve s the " second paradox of blackmail"-i.e., provides an explanation of
why target-initiated bribery is legal when it is substantive ly the same transaction as blackmailer
initiated blackmail, which is illegal; (b) none of the extant economic ju stifications of blackmail's
criminalization satisfy this criterion; and therefore (c) none of the extant economic justifications solve s
the Blackmail Paradox). For responses to DeLong' s argument-Qr at least to this kind of argument
see ROTIIBARD, supra note 12, at 129-30 ("Legally, there should be a property right to pay a bribe, but
not to take one," for it is usually only the bribe-taker who violate s some c ontractual obligation to a third
party); Berman, supra note I, at 867-70 (arguing that DeLong's '" pu zzle' .. . is not very puzzling" on
the basis that bribery should not ordin arily be cri minalized); Gorr, supra note 5, at 63-64 (initiation is
an indic ation of whether or not the individual who presetved the sec ret in e xchange for mone y intended
to blackmail the vic tim and therefore to whether or not the transaction counts as blackmail); Lamond,

supra note l, at 235 ("The e xplanation of why it is significant whic h party initiates the transaction
follows from the role of threats in constituting the wrong in blac kmail. Where [the target] initiate s the
transaction there is no reason to question the validity of her conse nt to that transaction."); Lindgren,

supra note 14, at 1 979-80 ((a) the answer to DeLong' s argument "may lie in c oercion or the threat"
and (b) "an exploitation theory should be able to handle it fairly easily"); Posner, supra note S, at 1836
(" [E]conomic analysis may explain why it is not blac kmail for a person who gets wind that another is
about to disclose damaging information about him to approac h that pe rs on and pay him to keep mu m.
Allowing suc h transac tions is unlike ly to give rise to an industry of dirt-seekers, with all the squandere d
re source s thereby implied, since the dirtseekers could not advertise for or otherwise see k out customers
(which would be blackmail) but wou ld have to wait for the latter to come upon them by c hance.");
Smith, supra note S, at 908 ( "[T] he legality of [target-initiated] transactions make s se nse.

If the

potential victim feels secure enough to initiate the transaction, there is more reason to think the vic tim
is not the type to undertake violent self-help. ").
Christopher, supra note 8, at 1 1 37-44.

For critiques of most of these responses,

see

K.
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We Have No Reason to Believe that Legal Threatened Action Entails
Legal Threat

As was pointed out in the Introduction, what generates the Blackmail
Paradox is the fact that threats and threatened actions normally have the
same legal status.

Block and Gordon go one step further and argue that

this correlation must be the case, that the legal status of the threatened
action entails the legal status of the threat.76 But, first, it is not clear why

they hold this principle and not the converse-namely, that the legal status

of the threat entails the legal status of the threatened action, in which case
the illegality of blackmail threats rather than the legality of disclosure
would be the starting point.
Second, Block and Gordon ' s point is less an argument than a
stipulation. They do not support their point that one entails the other; they
simply assert it. To be sure, if they were correct, they would have proven

that blackmail threats should be legal. But we have no reason to believe
that they are correct in the first place. We have no reason to believe that
there is an entailment relation rather than simply a virtually, but not fully,

exceptionless correlation between the legal statuses of threats and their
threatened actions.

Until such a reason is given, we may conclude that

Block and Gordon's point at best restates the B lackmail Paradox rather
than solves it. 77
B.

The Central Argument: Blackmail Threats Should Be Criminalized
and Therefore Do Not Belong to the Family of Legally Permissible
Threats-Even Though They Do Not Qualify as Attempted Theft
The argument in Part ill.B above suggests that there are two different

families of interests.

Into the first family fall interests of which our

continued enjoyment is legally protected. Call this the "LP"-"Legally
Protected"-family. They include such interests as life, physical well

being, emotional well-being, family, liberty, and property. Into the second

family fall interests either (a) that one does not already enj oy or (b) to
which her continued enjoyment is not legally protected. These interests
include affordable products and services (for consumers); freedom from
competition (for buyers and sellers); freedom from being sued (for
citizens);

freedom

from

consumer

boycotts,

strikes,

and

employee

shortages (for businesses); pay raises, promotions, and freedom from firing
(for employees); freedom from governmental funding cuts (for funding
recipients); and freedom from force or economic sanctions (for countries).
Call this the ''NLP"-''Not Legally Protected"-family of interests. To be
sure, they may be regulated with regard to time, place, and manner.
76
77

See supra notes 38, 39.

For another critique ofB1ock & Gordon, see generally Lindgren, supra note 7.
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they are not protected to nearly the same degree as life, physical well
being, emotional well-being, family, liberty, and property.

Why,

then, do life, physical well-being, etc. find themselves in the LP

family rather than in the NLP family?

This is certainly not an arbitrary

categorization. It is not as though we could easily "pluck" one or more of
these out and throw them into the NLP family with any ethical or rational
impunity.

There is a deeper reason underlying the superficial legal fact

that these interests are legally protected and that those in the NLP are not.
But what might this deeper reason be?

What distinguishes life, physical

well-being, etc. from all of those interests in the NLP family-and
therefore the deeper reason in virtue of which these interests enjoy legal
protection when the NLP interests do not-is quite simple: LP interests are
generally more valuable to their owners than NLP interests.

They are

simply on two different "value tiers." On the one hand, LP interests are on
the top value tier-generally

supremely valued (or cherished or venerated)

by their owners and rarely, if ever, in competition or conflict with
another's supremely valued interests. That is, it is rarely the case that one
confronts the situation where she may continue to enj oy her LP interests
only at the expense of another individual's LP interests.

On the other

hand, NLP interests are on the second value tier. They are generally

highly

valued, but simply not to the same degree as LP interests, and they are
often in competition or conflict with other individuals' equally highly
valued NLP interests. It is often the case that one may enjoy or continue to
enjoy her NLP interests only at the expense of another's NLP interests.
It follows from this distinction between LP interests and NLP interests
that there are not just one but two different justifications for criminalizing
threats to LP interests.

The first we already saw in Part III.B above.

Extortionate threats against another's life, physical well-being, etc. are
illegal because they constitute attempted theft. They attempt to coerce the
target into paying for something to which she is already legally entitled
the continued enjoyment of the particular interest being threatened.

But

there is a second justification for punishing extortionate threats. fudeed, it
is a justification that also applies to three other crimes as well-menacing,
harassment, and stalking.

These kinds of acts are criminalized primarily

because they involve the reasonable likelihood, and often the intent, of
78
putting the target into a state of great fear and anxiety.
And criminal law
78 In New York, the Jaws against menaciilg are designed to protect people from "reasonable fear
of physical injury, serious physical injury or death" and "fear of death, imminent serious physical
injury or physical injury." N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.14, 120.15 (McKinney 2004). The Jaws against
harassment are designed to protect people from "reasonable fear of physical injury" and "annoyance or
alarm." !d. § § 240.25, 240.26, 240.31, 240.32. And the Jaws against stalking are designed to protect
people from "reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or property of such person,
a member of such person's immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted";
"material harm to the mental or emotional health of such person"; "reasonabl[e] fear that his or her
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rests in part on the bedrock assumption that people are entitled-qua
people, qua members of the moral community-to freedom from this kind
of deliberately inflicted harm to their emotional well-being.

Why would the criminal law care about people's emotional well-being

in the first place?

Again, the criminal law is largely concerned with

protecting people against deliberately inflicted harm to their supremely
valued interests.

And, as we have already seen above, emotional well
Again, the other supremely

being is supremely valued by most people.

valued interests are life, physical well-being, family, liberty, and property.
Indeed, that is why we see the criminal law protecting people against
deliberately inflicted harm to these interests in the form of criminal laws
against

homicide,

manslaughter,

rape,

assault,

battery,

kidnapping,

unlawful imprisonment, and theft.
If this argument is correct, and if reputation qualifies as a supremely
valued interest, then threats to reputation should also be criminalized.
Well, as it turns out, reputation does qualify as a supremely valued interest.

For better or worse, reputation is generally supremely valued by its
owners-just as much, if not more in many cases, than life, physical well
being, family, liberty, and property. Many people would rather give up
their money, freedom, and even their lives or "right arms" than lose their
reputations. Indeed, that is why we have civil laws against defamation
i.e., against dissemination of false, reputation-damaging information-and
sometimes even criminal laws against maliciously ruining a person 's
7
reputation with true information. 9 So threats against reputation are likely
to put the target into as much, if not more, fear and anxiety than threats
against these other supremely valued interests.
And if this likely

employment, business or career is threatened"; "reasonabl[e] fear [ot] physical injury or serious
physical injury, the commission of a sex offense against, or the kidnapping. unlawful imprisonment or
death of such person or a member of such person's immediate family''; and "reasonable fear of physical
injury, serious physical injury or death." Id. §§ 120.45, 120.50.
19 For example, N.Y. Penal Law §§ 135.60 (McKinney 2004) and 155.05 (McKinney 1999), both
indicate that "an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt
or ridicule" constitutes grounds for criminal punishment. For statutory text, see supra note 2 and
accompanying text (emphasis added); see also ROTHBARD, supra note 12, at 121 ("The current libel
laws make [dissemination of a truthful statement] illegal if done with 'malicious' intent, even though
the information be true."); Bennan, supra note 1, at 843-44 (prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), "a majority of states had constitutional or statutory
provisions" according to which defendants who had disclosed embarrassing information about others
were subject to prosecution for criminal libel even if the information was truthful if these disclosures
were not "published with good motives and for justifiable ends''); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 90, 93-94
((a) in the United States, there is (and should be) a tort for public disclosure of private information
about another "even though it is true and no action would lie for defamation"; and (b) this tort requires
at least four conditions to be satisfied: public disclosure, the damage consists in the public disclosure,
the public does not have a "legitimate interest in having the information made available," and the
information "would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities").
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consequence in conj unction with the moral assumption that people do not
deserve deliberately inflicted damage to their emotional well-being is
sufficient to criminalize extortionate threats, menacing, harassment, and
stalking, then it is also sufficient to criminalize threats to reputation-i.e.,
blackmail. 80
The most obvious objection against the position that reputation

qualifies as a supremely valued interest is that it does not fall into the LP
family. Rather, it falls squarely into the NLP family. We generally enjoy
it, but, again, we are not legally entitled to its continued enjoyment-i.e.,
to freedom from the non-disclosure of true but reputation-damaging
information.

We are at most entitled only to freedom from the non

publication of false reputation-damaging information. This much seems
right.8 1 But it is not conclusive. For (a) what puts reputation into the NLP
family and keeps it out of the LP family is merely a superficial legal fact;
and (b) there is a deeper, normative reason why reputation should be

treated with the same reverence as members of the LP family.

Regarding (a), the superficial legal fact that puts reputation into the

NLP family and keeps it out of the LP family is society's determination
that the institution of freedom of speech outweighs or "trumps" the harm

that some true disclosures may do to people 's reputations. This fact is
superficial because it does not reflect the intrinsic value or worth of

reputation, only a contingent societal judgment about the relative weights
of reputation and freedom of speech. I say contingent because it does not

strain reason to think that society might very well have adopted the reverse

judgment and made truthful but reputation-damaging disclosures illegal.
Indeed, as indicated just above, some states do prohibit true, reputation
2
damaging disclosures that are maliciously motivated. 8
Regarding (b), reputation is generally also supremely valuable to its

owner. It is just as valuable, if not more so, to its owner as life, physical
well-being, etc. So while reputations seem to meet the "letter" of the NLP
family, they meet the deeper normative "spirit" of the LP family. While a
superficial societal judgment denies them certain legal protection, they are
normatively of a kind with other supremely valued interests. As a result, a

blackmailer' s threat against a target's reputation is morally equivalent to a

80

See Greenawalt, supra note 40, at 1 1 1 5 ("In the ordinary situation in which a single hann, say

disclosure of embarrassing infonnation, is threatened, a judgment may reasonably be made that the
hann itself is socially acceptable, but that a threat to engage in it coupled with a demand puts socially
unacceptable pressure on the victim to comply with the demand.").
81

82

But see supra note 79.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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threat against any other LP interest. And since the latter is serious enough
to merit criminal punishment, so is the former. 83
It is very tempting to think that because . blackmailers threaten legal

actions (truthful disclosure) and extortionists illegal actions, blackmail is
not

as

"bad" or wrong as extortion.

But this first appearance is false.

Blackmail threats are just as wrong as extortionate threats.84 Given that

reputation may be just

as,

if not more, socially, economically, and

psychologically important to its owner than other LP interests, a threat to
spread reputation-damaging information is arguably more wrongful than a
threat to kidnap, steal, defraud, vandalize, or, possibly in some more
extreme cases, even kill or maim. 85 This is why Ronald Coase refers to

83 See Shavell, supra note 1 1 , at 1903 ("I suspect that most individuals view blackmail as
deserving of punishment . . . because blackmail involves the calculated imposition of suffering upon its
victims.").
14

One might argue that threats to injure another's reputation (with truthful information) cannot be

wrong. For disclosure itself is not wrong. And we know that disclosure is not wrong because it is
perfectly legally permissible. But this argument simply does not work. Just because a given action is
legally permissible does not mean that it is morally permissible. Even though disclosure is legal, it is
often morally impermissible. (Conversely, concealment is often morally permissible-contrary to its
otherwise derogatory connotations. See Lindgren, supra note 1 , at 9 1 4-16.) Freedom of speech may
permit revealing another's secrets and thereby embarrassing her. But it does not necessarily make such
activity right. See Gordon, supra note 7, at 1759, 1764-66 (using the Doctrine of Double Effect to
show that the fact that the threatened action is legal does not make the blackmailer's threat any less
wrong); Hardin, supra note 5, at 1808 ("The fact that there is nothing illegal about my actions might be
the ground for thinking that there is nothing wrong with them . . . But unless the principle of rightness
or goodness is very broadly conceived, this [Hobbesian or positive law] view is conspicuously false to
the historical facts of many laws."); Lindgren, supra note 7, at 40 ("[N]ot all immoral behavior is
criminal. This may be because either the behavior is not sufficiently immoral, it does not cause serious

enough harm or it is not a traditional concern of the criminal law."); Owens, supra note 5, at SOl (it is
within the rights of, but not necessarily right for, an editor to publish injurious gossip or to sell it to
other editors); Waldron, supra note 14, at 23 ("[T]he law recognizes wider categories of wrongdoing
than it penalizes. The criminal law does not exhaust the legal system's designation of certain actions as
'wrong' . . . .

The law . . . recognizes certain principles of public morality even though it is not

prepared-for various reasons-to enforce them directly through the criminal law.").
85

See POSNER, supra note 23, at 287 ("Reputation . . . has important economic functions in a

market system . . . . It reduces the search costs of buyers and sellers and makes it easier for the superior

producer to increase his sales relative to those of inferior ones . . . . It is just as vital to the functioning

of the 'marriage market,' the market in friends, the political market, and so on." (citation omitted));
Alldridge, supra note 13, at 375 ("[T]o most men the idea of losing their fame and reputation is

equally, if not more terrific than the dread of personal injury." (quoting R. v. Hickman, [ 1784] l Leach

278)). For an eloquent account of the close connection between reputation and another arguable LP

interest, privacy, see generally JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF

PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000).

This point is not as hard to accept when we consider that some lawful acts can be morally worse

than some unlawful ones. Indeed, it is arguably morally worse maliciously to drive a company out of

business, which is sometimes legal, than to steal a few thousand dollars from it, which is always illegal.
Likewise, if we may be permitted to compare apples and oranges, it is arguably morally worse to
perform the legal act of refusing to visit one's beloved, fatally ill mother for frivolous reasons than it is
to perform the criminal act of purchasing marijuana, especially for medicinal purposes.
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blackmail as "moral murder";86 why Lord C.J. Lane states that "in the

calendar of criminal offences, blackmail is one of the ugliest . . . because it
87
involves what really amounts, so often, to attempted murder of the souf';
and why Bechhofer Roberts states that "blackmail is by many people

considered the foulest of crimes-far crueler than most murders, because
of its cold-blooded premeditation and repeated torture of the victim."88
C.

Objections Against My Justification for Criminalizing Blackmail in
Part IV.B
Objection 1: Life, physical well-being, etc. are not trumped out of the

LP family by any social value in the way that reputation is trumped out of
the LP family by freedom of speech. Therefore life, physical well-being,
etc. must be more highly valued by their owners, in which case reputation
does not belong even normatively to the LP family.

Reply: It is merely a contingent fact that no other social value trumps
life , physical well-being, etc. out of the LP family. For example, it is easy
enough to imagine that society might have decided that national security is
more important than individual liberty; that, given the tragic events of
9/ 1 1 , it would be preferable to restrict, if not eliminate, people 's various
liberties (religious exercise, assembly, privacy, etc.) for the sake of
safeguarding the nation from spying, terrorist plots, and other hostile
threats. If this were the case, if liberty had been trumped out of the family
of LP interests in this way, our individual liberties would have suffered
dramatically. But we might still continue to value----indeed, miss-them
just as much as we value life, physical well-being, emotional well-being,
and property. The fact that we decided to make national security our top
priority would not necessarily have made us value individual liberties any
less than the other LP interests. Likewise, then, with reputation. The fact
that we value freedom of speech even more than reputation does not
necessarily mean that we value reputation any less than the other LP
interests.
Objection 2: Yes, the ''blackmailer's actions generate fear and
anxiety."89 But many perfectly legal threats generate fear and anxiety too.
So why should blackmail threats be singled out? As Walter Block argues:
Causing anxiety is not, per se, a ground for criminal
prohibition.
86

A great number of human activities-from

Coase, supra note 1 1, at 675.
Alldridge, supra note 13, at 382 (quoting R v. Hadjou, [1989] 1 1 Crim. App. 29).
81
Coase, supra note l l , at 674 (quoting THE OLD BAILEY TRIAL SERIES, THE MR. A CASE 9
(C.E. Bechhofer Roberts ed., 1950)).
8
9 Coase, supra note 1 1 , at 675; see also Levin, supra note 3, at 12 (blackmail should remain
illegal because "legal blackmail would create too much anxiety''); Shavell, supra note l l , at 1 894,
1 898.
87
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exams to hangliding to investing in the stock market to being
'victimized' by 'hate' speech-are anxiety-producing, but we

do not see such anxiety as a legitimate reason for seeking to

prevent such activities.

Almost any change is potentially

anxiety-producing, and a policy of anxiety reduction would

be a prescription for maintaining the status quo. If anxiety is
a problem, it is better to see a psychiatrist.90
If

Reply:

Obj ection

2-and

Block's

argument-worked,

then

extortionate threats, menacing, harassment, and stalking should not be

criminalized.

For, again, the main reason why these kinds of acts are

criminalized is because they tend to cause especially high levels of fear and
anxiety.91

Yet they clearly should be criminalized.

wrong.

So Objection 2 is

Where, then, does it go astray? There are two significant differences

between (a) fear-and-anxiety-generating threats or activities that are legal
and

(b)

fear-and-anxiety-generating

threats that

are

criminal

(i.e.,

extortionate threats, menacing, harassment, and stalking). First, the level

of fear and anxiety that the latter are thought to generate is significantly

higher than the level of fear and anxiety thought to be generated by the
former.

Second, while the fear and anxiety generated by legally

permissible threats or activities may be counter-balanced by a sufficiently
strong justification-e.g., capitalism, competition, or education-the fear

and anxiety generated by extortionate threats, menacing, harassment, and

stalking are not compensated for by any such moral or institutional

justification. 92

Objection 3: A person is morally entitled to whatever reputation

accurately reflects her norm-violations. If, for example, a certain

man

has

a reputation for being a faithful husband and yet has cheated on his wife,

then he is not morally entitled to this reputation.

On the contrary, he is

morally entitled to the very opposite reputation-the reputation of an
adulterer.93

So it is tough luck if threats to disclose true but reputation-

90

Block, Replies, supra note 12, at 23; see also Lindgren, supra note 5, at 604-05.

91

See supra note 78.

92

At least in society's judgment. Legislatures did a balancing test and decided that the pleasure

that a stalker derives from stalking does not come close to justifying the fear and anxiety that it causes
the stalker's target. The same is true of blackmail. Legislatures deemed that the capitalist nature of
blackmail threats do not justify the fear and anxiety that they cause the blackmailer's target.
93

See Gorr, supra note 5, at 63 ("[I]t hardly seems likely that [an adulterer] is morally entitled to

complain" about being exposed); Murphy, supra note 5, at 1 62 (we are not entitled to a good reputation
if we have performed actions inconsistent with it); Scalise, supra note 8, at 1 508, 1 5 1 1 ("One's right in
one's reputation is limited to disclosure of acts he has committed and to nondisclosure for acts he has
not committed. [One] may try to hide the fact that he committed act X, but he cannot be said to have a
right of nondisclosure concerning act X.

...

While an individual generally has a right to her

reputation, she does not possess a right to a reputation of a person she is not.").
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He is

getting precisely what he deserves. He made his bed; now he must lie in
it.94
Reply: Objection 3 is far too puritanical. It holds people to the very
difficult, if not impossibly high, standard of acting at all times in complete

conformity with their unblemished public appearance. A person is not
necessarily morally entitled to a reputation that perfectly tracks each and

every one of her norm-violations.

The mere fact that one has violated a

social or moral norm does not necessarily mean that that she deserves

disclosure of this fact to third parties or the public in general. Indeed, if
this were the case, most of us would have much worse reputations than we
9
currently enjoy. 5 Yet most of us who have good reputations still feel that
we deserve them, despite whatever mistakes we have made or weaknesses
we may have.
Whether or not a norm-violator deserves disclosure of embarrassing
information depends on many different things, including what norm she

violated, whether or not the norm is morally correct, the internal

(psychological) and external circumstances under which she violated it,
how often she has violated it, the magnitude (or egregiousness) of the
violation, and the reasonably foreseeable consequences of disclosing the

In many situations, this combination of factors will lead us to
conclude that the norm-violator does not deserve disclosure and even that

violation.

such disclosure would be morally despicable.
For example, we may reason that the norm should not be a norm in the
first place. Consider the stigma that often attaches to homosexuality.
Many feel that this attitude is morally wrong and therefore that it is
morally proper to keep homosexuals' sexual orientation a secret rather than
to disclose it and let them be subjected to unfair discrimination.
A second example: even if an individual does deserve disclosure, she
may not deserve the degree of reputation injury that disclosure will cause.
For the degree of reputation injury is often well out of proportion to the

norm-violation itself.

One need only read Nathaniel Hawthorne's The

94 Objection 3 actually rests on four unstated assumptions: (a) the husband is responsible for
cheating, (b) he therefore deserves the reasonably foreseeable consequences of cheating, (c) a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of cheating would be its public disclosure, and (d) a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of public disclosure would be injury to his reputation as a faithful husband.
95 See ROSEN, supra note 85, at 12 ("[T]he sociologist Erving Goffinan argued that individuals,
like actors in a theater, need backstage areas where they can let down their public masks, collect
themselves, and relieve the tensions that are an inevitable part of public performance. In addition to
protecting freedom and self-expression . . . the privacy of the backstage protects us from the unfairness
of being misjudged by strangers who don't have time to put our informal speech and conduct into a
broader context." (citation omitted)); Levin, supra note 3, at 12 ("If you are like me, you have done
things you hope remain hidden. Not terrible things-nothing criminal, . . . but . . . you want the lid to
stay on. . . . All pertinent physical evidence and memories dissolved long ago in the cosmic increase
in entropy, thank God.").
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Scarlet Letter to see how severely society may stigmatize an arguably
96
minor, or at least common, norm-violation (in that case, adultery).

A third example: we might feel that what an individual did was wrong
but not that wrong, that she does not therefore deserve to lose her job, that

her employer will still fire her if he finds out, and therefore that it is better

that her norm-violation be concealed than disclosed.
Finally, a fourth example: we might feel that what an individual did

was very wrong but that it would still be better for her and those around her
if she learned from her mistake on her own rather than from the overly
harsh consequences that would ensue from disclosure.
Objection 4: But what about situations in which the blackmail target's
actions are egregious and therefore public disclosure is clearly warranted?

Consider, again, the man who has a reputation as a faithful husband even

though he cheats on his wife. Suppose now that he cheats on his wife not

now and then but all the time. For years during his marriage, he has slept
with hundreds of different women (or maybe only a few women hundreds
of different times). Yet his reputation as a faithful husband remains

untarnished.

Clearly, he deserves to lose this reputation; his reputation
therefore does not normatively belong to the family of LP interests; and the

blackmailer

is

not committing

a wrong comparable

to

menacing,

harassment, or stalking by threatening to expose him and thereby give him
the reputation that he deserves.

Reply: Moral egregiousness is not a legal category. So the law cannot
draw a sharp line between egregious and non-egregious behavior and

therefore between instances in which one deserves to lose her reputation
97
and those in which she does not.
Instead, legislatures have a choice to

make. On the one hand, they may establish the presumption that blackmail
targets generally fall into the "egregious" category and therefore that
threats to their reputations are not presumptively as wrong as threats to life,
physical well-being, etc. On the other hand, legislatures may establish the

presumption that blackmail targets generally fall into the "non-egregious"

category and therefore that threats to their reputations are presumptively as
wrong as threats to life, physical well-being, etc. If they choose the
former, then there would seem to be little reason to make blackmail

criminal. After all, the blackmail targets would simply be getting what
they presumptively deserve. If they choose the latter, then most or all

blackmail . would be illegal.

The historical and empirical fact is that

legislatures have overwhelmingly, if not universally, adopted the latter
96
97

NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1 850).

But see Friedman, supra note 3, at l l OO (referencing late 19th century Florida statutes that
punished "flagrant" fornication more harshly than more occasional or clandestine fornication and late
1 9th century California statutes that punished "open and notorious" adultery more harshly than more
occasional or clandestine adultery).
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approach.

And this is very strong evidence indeed that these same

legislatures regard blackmail as a serious and unjustified threat to a
supremely valued interest (i.e., emotional well-being).

Objection 5:

Suppose that Seducer threatens to seduce Wife away from

Husband unless Husband makes payment to Seducer.

Because Husband

loves Wife very much, she qualifies as one of his supremely valued
interests. So, based on the argument in Part N.B, Seducer's threat should
be criminalized.

Yet this is absurd.

Freedom of speech alone justifies

Seducer's making a profit-motivated threat against Husband to seduce
98
Wife.

Reply:

There are two significant disanalogies between threats to ruin

reputations by disclosing true information and threats to seduce spouses.
The first disanalogy: all else being equal, the target of the threat of
disclosure has little, if any, power to inhibit the disclosure.

Without

performing criminal acts like · kidnapping or unlawful imprisonment, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to keep others from talking about them.

In

contrast, Husband has greater power to inhibit Seducer's seducing Wife.
Husband may try to weaken or undermine Seducer's seduction efforts not
merely by trying to pressure or persuade Seducer not to make the attempt
in the first place but also by trying to pressure or persuade Wife not to be
seduced if Seducer does try.

So while the potential victim of disclosure

may hope only to keep the would-be gossip from disclosing, Husband has
not merely one but two different avenues to pursue.
The second disanalogy: partly because of the first disanalogy above,
disclosure of information has a (much) higher likelihood of producing the
desired result (damage to reputation) than do attempts at seduction. As we
all know from dating, the latter are much more susceptible to failure than
the former.

Put more archaically, there is much more of a "necessary

connection" between disclosure of reputation-damaging information and
damage to reputation than attempts at seduction and actual seduction.
While the former requires only people who are aware of social norms and
have a cognitive understanding of the disclosure, the latter requires
something more difficult to come by-namely, a willing obj ect of
seduction.
For both these reasons, the target of the seduction threat is likely to
feel less powerless and vulnerable-and therefore less threatened-than
the target of a disclosure threat.

So society may assume as a general rule

that threats of seduction are not likely to produce the especially high levels
of fear and anxiety that threats to life, physical well-being, family, liberty,
property, and-yes-reputation will cause.

98 I owe this objection to Walter Block.
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Blackmail Is Not an Ordinary Economic Transaction
The argument in Part lli.D suggests that there are no substantive

differences between blackmail transactions and other ordinary economic
transactions.

In response to this argument, this section will simply draw

upon the efforts of other scholars and borrow the assortment of substantive
distinctions that they have argued exist between blackmail threats and
ordinary economic transactions. While the reader may not agree with all
of them, the aggregate collection certainly helps to cast doubt on the notion
that the former may be easily assimilated into the latter:

9)

In a legitimate business transaction, the seller "is offering
consideration in the form of abstaining from some profit or
advantage which he might legitimately enjoy, and is quite
different from the common blackmailer who surrenders no
profit or advantage of his own in return for the money he
receives. "99

1 0) "One test whether there was a lawful business interest is
whether some material advantage would come to the
[blackmailer] through the carrying out of his threat. If so,
he is usually entitled to renounce the advantage in return
100

for the payment of money."

1 1 ) "The demands made by a businessman are constrained by
the competition of other businessmen, by the fact that the
party threatened is likely to have a good idea of whether
the threat has to be taken seriously and by the adverse
effects on future business of being difficult in negotiating.
None of this applies in the ordinary blackmail case. There
is no competition.
101
blackmailer."
99

The victim has to deal with the

A.H. Campbell, supra note 20, at 388.

100

Williams, supra note 8, at 172; see also Altman, supra note 4, at 1 640 (blackmailers differ

significantly from other sellers since, unlike other sellers, they would give away their product were they
not able to sell it); Comment, supra note 42, at 1478 ("[T]he blackmail transaction, unlike the [sale of
newspapers], does not have a communicative purpose.

The blackmailer uses the threat of

communication only as a sanction to obtain property. It is irrelevant to the blackmailer whether the
communication occurs.").
101

Coase, supra note 1 1 , at 675; see also Kipnis, supra note 1, at 2 1

("In a Libertarian utopia,

it

will be very, very lucrative to be alone in offering urgently needed goods and services to those who
have only hideously unattractive alternatives.

This is blackmail's distinctive economic beauty.");

Owens, supra note 5, at 505 ("[T]he blackmailer is a monopolist and is in a position to dictate unfair

terms of trade."). But see Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605 (rejecting this point as a distinction between
blackmail and legal transactions); Waldron, supra note 14, at 14

("It

is sometimes said that a

blackmailer bargains from a monopoly position. But he doesn't. What he depends on is the 'victim's
understanding that, whatever the likelihood (short of certainty) of his being exposed by someone else,

he is more likely than that to be exposed by the blackmailer if he doesn't give him what he asks.").
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12) "[C]oncem for future business will not moderate a

blackmailer's demands. If this factor has any influence, it
pays the blackmailer to be unreasonable and even to carry
out his threat, since this would make future victims take
02
his threats more seriously." 1

13) '"Ordinary blackmail' is singled out [from other legitimate

economic transactions], not because its bad features are
unique, but because there is nothing good about it to
overcome the badness.

. . .

'Ordinary blackmail'

is

coercive, exploitative, invasive, etc., like many other social

practices, but the point is that there is very little good
03
about it."1

14) "We could inhibit transactions in privacy without thereby
inhibiting economic life and bargaining in general . . . .
[But t]he kind of worries which [criminal restrictions on

ruthless but legal economic transactions] would introduce
into economic life might well inhibit those general

incentives which are, for better or worse, the lifeblood of a
04
capitalistic economy." 1
1 5) "[The blackmail victim] cannot appeal to the law, since
this would involve that disclosure of facts which he 1s
1 05
anxious to avoid. "

1 6) "[T]he [ordinary commercial] transaction will be above

board and so any illegal consequences will be more likely
1
to be visible to the law." 06

2
10

Coase, supra note 1 1 , at 675. Lindgren rejects this point as a distinction between blackmail

and legal transactions. Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605.
103

104
105

Smilansky, Blackmail, supra note 9, at 153.
Murphy, supra note 5, at 166.
Coase, supra note 1 1, at 675 ; see also H ardin, supra note 5, at 1 8 1 4 ("A motivating factor of

the intellectual debate over blackmail may be not its supposedly paradoxical aspect but merely the
perverse quality of much blackmail: one cannot go to law to block its use and potential effects because
Jaw is public ."); Kipnis, supra note I, at 22 ("[T]he mark must waive the very secrecy he or she is
contractually entitled to in ord er judicially to secure that same entitlement to secrecy: one must waive
secrecy in order to secure secrecy . . . . [B]I ackmail contracts can require the client who seeks judicial
relief to forfeit thereby all the entitlements explicitly guaranteed to him or her under the terms of the
contract . . . .

Contracts calling for the concealment of guilty secrets have precisely that flawed

structure."); Levin, supra note 3, at 13 ("[S] ecret contracts are hard to enforce; suing a blackmailer
would announce that the plaintiff has something to hide and, almost inevitably, what it is-as
blackmailers would fully realize . . . . For that matter, most blackmailers would threaten disclosure to
victims demanding a contract. "). But see Block, Replies, supra note 12, at 26 ("Blackmail secrets are
in fact not so different from trade secrets.

In both cases, there are dangers that attempts to force a

contractual partner to live up to his obligations will boomerang."); Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605
(rejecting this point as a distinction between blackmail and legal transactions).
6
10

Smith, supra note 5, at 912.
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1 7) In the ordinary commercial transaction, the seller ''is not

using shame to his advanta�e and the offeree has no
0
resulting interest in secrecy."1
·

·

1 8) Blackmail threats much more commonly motivate their
targets

to resort to harmful ''self-help"

tactics-i.e.,

retaliating against the threat-makers or third parties with
violence, turning to crime (theft or fraud) to pay off their
08
blackmailers, and committing suicide. 1

1 9) "Business negotiations (which may also cause anxiety)
either lead to a breakdown of the negotiations or they lead

to a contract.

There is, at any rate, an end.

But in the

ordinary blackmail case there is no end. The victim, once

he succumbs to the blackmailer, remains in his grip for an
09
indefinite period." 1

20) Blackmail does not constitute a valid contract because the

agreement to refrain from exercising "immoral liberties"-

107

Id
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
109 Coase, supra note 1 1, at 675; see also Clark, supra note 9, at 60; DeLong. supra note 1 1 , at
1 690-9 1 ; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1 626 ("The essence of [the blackmailer's] dominance over [the
101

.

target] is the prospect of repeated demands . . . . Blackmail occurs when, by virtue of the demand and
the action satisfying the demands, the blackmailer knows that she can repeat the demand in the future.
Living with that knowledge puts the victim of blackmail in a permanently subordinate position.");
Hardin, supra note 5, at 1 800; Isenbergh, supra note 1 , at 1930; Levin, supra note 3, at 14 (''[O]nce the
buyer of an automobile drives it off the lot, the dealer is powerless to make further demands, whereas
the blackmailer will almost always retain some leverage . . . .

[T]he desire (or need) to which

blackmail services cater persists after the service is rendered. After you have bought the blackmailer's
silence, you still want him to be silent . . . . Obtaining the object of any standard desire eliminates the
desire itself. But not with blackmail . . . . When I pay him not to tell, I stiff want (or need) him to
refrain . . . But once the silence of the blackmailer is something to buy . . . there is no end of it. The
blackmailer's goods, one might say, can never be consumed."); Murphy, supra note 5, at 166
(blackmail transactions

are

"unending in nature.

Unlike oUter economic transactions, blackmail

transactions often put the target in a position where she is never really sure if she has finally bought the
commodity or servico-i.e., the silence, the freedom from exposure. The blackmailer is like the person
who sells you shoes for an agreed price of $20, sneaks them out of your closet every week or so, and
then sells them back to you (perhaps for $30 and then $40) again, and again, and again-endlessly.");
Posner, supra note 5, at 1 840; Shavell, supra note 1 1, at 1878, 1 884-87, 1 888, 1 890 (in-depth
sec Altman, supra note 4, at
1655-56 (making a similar point but later critiCizing Fletcher); Berman, supra note I , at 824-25 (the
potential for repetition does not explain why blackmail is a crime); Block, supra note 1 , at 6-7;
Lindgren, supra note 5, at 605 (rejecting the potential for repetition as a distinction between blackmail
and legal transactions); Smith, supra note 5, at 889, 908-{)9 (the potential for repetition does not

discussion of the problem of repeated demands). For critical responses,

explain why blackmail is a crime). Block suggests that a possible solution to the problem of potential
for repetition is to rent rather than sell silence on a "renewable" or "renegotiable" basis.

Replies, supra note 12, at 24.

Block,
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i.e., from committing a violation "of a moral, although not
a legal, duty"--does not constitute consideration, as it
"would make the law a tool for extortion" and is therefore
11
contrary to public policy. 0

21) The

difference between blackmail and legally permissible

threats is that the former threaten to exercise "immoral
liberty"-i.e., morally wrong but legally permissible
actions-while the latter threaten to exercise only "moral
111
liberties. "

22) While

"central case blackmail" is "nonallocative," the
1 12
ordinary commercial exchange is "allocative. "

23) The blackmailer intends to harm the target. 1 1 3
24) While even the hard economic transaction

starts out with a

non-coercive proposal, a proposal that does not force the
target to choose between two of her rights, the blackmail
transaction starts out with a coercive proposal, a proposal
that does force the target to choose between two of her
ll
rights; 4

25)

"[T]he avenues open to the [target] in the [ordinary

commercial transaction] are more extensive and less
1 15

harmful than the options of the blackmail victim."

26) We

cannot expect blackmailers and their targets to weigh

the costs, benefits, and risks of their transactions in a
11
rational manner. 6

27) "[O]ur

intuitions, for better or worse, probably lead us to
sympathize with the [target of an expensive but

desperately needed offer] more than with a blackmail
11
victim." 7

110
111

Goodhart, supra note 7, at 436, 440-42, 448-49.

See id at 436, 440-42, 448-49. Lindgren rejects Goodhart's position because it fails to

explain why profit-motivated threats to perform morally permissible or obligatory actions (e.g.,
reporting incriminating information)

Lindgren, supra note 8, at 681-82.
1 12
113
1 14

1 15

also considered blackmail. Lindgren, supra note l , at 910;

Gordon, supra note 7, at 1 770.
/d
. at 1771.

See D. Campbell, supra note 20, at 885, 887-92. I articulated the opposite position toward the

end of Part III.B.
116

are

Smith, supra note 5, at 9 1 2.
Id at 866, 872, 875-76, 879, 906.

1 1 7 /d

.

. at 913.

[Vol. 39: 1051

CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW

1 094

It would take too much space for me to express my opinion about each

of these points. Suffice it to say that I believe that the majority of them are
mostly, if not entirely, plausible. And all it takes is one or two of them to
be correct to show that there are substantive differences between blackmail
transactions and ordinary economic transactions and therefore that the two
kinds of transactions may warrant different legal treatment.
E.

Legalization Would Not Help to Make Blackmail Targets Better Off
The main problem with the argument that legalization of blackmail

threats would help to make blackmail targets better off is that it is
speculative

and

therefore

counter-balanced

by

equally

speculative

considerations. First, if blackmail were legal, a greater number of people
would be threatened than would have been threatened in a blackmail
illegal society. For if blackmail were legal, there would be a greater
incentive-hopes of profit minus the risk of criminal punishment-to "dig
up" damaging information; and this greater incentive would translate into
more people digging up more damaging information about more people.
Second, if blackmail were legal, a greater amount of damaging
information would be disclosed than would have been disclosed in a
blackmail-illegal society.

There are three reasons.

The first reason is

simply that a much greater pool of damaging information and a greater
number of people sharing this information would be "dug up" than in a
blackmail-illegal society.

And where there is both more information and

more people who know this information, there is a greater chance of
"leakage"-accidental or deliberate.
The second reason is that, in a blackmail-illegal society, there would
be less incentive to dig up damaging information in the first place.

So a

greater fraction of the total (smaller) pool of damaging information would
very likely have been obtained accidentally rather than deliberately. And,
all else being equal, those who obtain damaging information accidentally
are less likely to be malicious-and therefore less likely maliciously to
disclose this information-than those who would deliberately dig up this
kind of information.
The third reason is that there is less of a disincentive in a blackmail
legal society to disclose damaging information than in a blackmail-illegal
society.

In both societies, the same incentives for disclosure exist:

to

teach blackmail targets who do not make payment a lesson and to make
their threats of disclosure all the more convincing to other actual and
potential blackmail targets. But only in a blackmail-illegal society are
these incentives counter-balanced by a significant disincentive:
the
heightened risk of criminal punishment.

Disclosure heightens this risk
because it potentially constitutes evidence of a prior blackmail threat.

THE SOLUTION TO THE REAL BLACKMAIL PARADOX

2007]

F.

1 095

If Blackmailer-Initiated Blackmail is Illegal, Then Target-Initiated
Blackmail Should Be Illegal as Well
If we assume that Blackmailer is guilty of criminal activity only when

she initiates the silence-for-pay transaction with Target and not when
Target initiates it, then we may proceed in one of two directions. We may
either attempt to justify this asymmetry or we may argue that the law
should,

contrary

to

fact,

treat

Blackmailer-initiated

silence-for-pay

transactions in just the same way as Target-initiated silence-for-pay
transactions. Importantly, however, this second approach may proceed in
either direction. We may argue that because Blackmailer is not guilty of
blackmail in Target-initiated transactions, she should not be guilty of
blackmail in Blackmailer-initiated transactions either. Or we may argue
the other way-that because Blackmailer is guilty of blackmail in
Blackmailer-initiated

transactions,

she

should

be

equally

guilty

of

blackmail in Target-initiated transactions.
This last approach is correct. 1 1 8 And the reason is simple: the very

same principle applies in extortion law. If Target approaches some person
P and asks P not to commit an illegal act against her in exchange for

money and P then accepts the money, P has committed extortion just as

much as if the same transaction had been initiated by P. 1 1 9

118

See FEINBERG, supra note 23, at 264 ("One wonders why the legal consequences should be
different when the same [silence-for-pay] transaction is initiated through [the blackmailer's] generosity
rather than [the target's] guilty anxiety.").
119
But see K. Christopher, supra note 8, at 1 1 32, 1 143-44, 1 147-48. See Lindgren, supra note
,
at
1 703, 1716 ("Nor is extortion always initiated by the official. Even if extortion were limited to
ll
coercion (which it isn't), a citizen may begin discussing extortion if she correctly anticipates that she
can't get fair treatment without making a payoff . .. . This is consistent with the historical approach to
extortion, an approach unconcerned with the precise method of wrongful taking-bribery, coercion, or
false pretenses."); Lindgren, supra note 29, at 835-36 ("[T] he Hobbs Act punishes the person obtaining
the property. It puts as little emphasis as possible on what or who does the inducing. The statute
focuses instead on who does the obtaining."); Smith, supra note 5, at 907 (" [M]uch of what we call
'extortion' . .. has the feature of preserving criminality in the mirror-image transaction. In official
extortion, an official B demands a payment from A in return for not harming A . ... [A]s in bribery,
both A and B are guilty regardless of whether A or B initiated the transaction." (citation omitted)).
In personal correspondence, Mitch Berman suggests that I may be contradicting myself. Berman
suggests that my central thesis that blackmail threats should be criminalized because (a) they cause
undue fear and anxiety and (b) acts that cause undue fear and anxiety should be criminalized may
commit me to the (absurd) position that even P's rejection of Target's offer should be criminalized.
For P's rejection of Target's offer may cause Target undue fear and anxiety that P will go ahead and
reveal her secret. My response to this very clever argument, however, is that I do not subscribe to (b).
The mere fact that a particular (kind of) action causes serious fear and anxiety does not by itself
warrant the conclusion that it should be criminalized. As I have argued above, the action must also not
have a sufficiently counter-balancing moral or institutional justification. In this case, P's rejecting
Target 's offer does have a sufficiently strong justification-namely, a moral and contract-law
sanctioned right voluntarily to reject economic offers that are made to her.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Blackmail Paradox has survived for so many decades because

scholars have misconstrued its essential nature.

It is not essentially an

amorphous metaphorical question about how two independently legal

components-a legal threat and a legal demand-may add up to an illegal

act.

Rather, it is essentially a question of which is correct--our intuition

that blackmail threats should be illegal or some very strong arguments that,
given the legality of disclosure, blackmail threats should also be legal.

This Article has offered both refutations of these arguments as well as a

novel positive justification for criminalizing blackmail threats.

Once

again, blackmail threats should be criminal for the same reason that

menacing, harassment, and stalking are:

they involve the reasonable

likelihood, not to mention intent, of putting the target into a state of

especially great fear and anxiety. And we as a society have decided that
like life, physical well-being, family, liberty, and property-emotional

well-being is a supremely valued interest and therefore should be protected
from deliberately inflicted injury when no competing moral or institutional

interests, such as freedom of speech, would themselves be compromised.

